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I. INTRODUCTION
The task of judging has been described as the art or science of making
discrete choices among competing courses of action.1 Charged with the
mandate to administer justice fairly and equitably, judges are said to have
discretion to pursue any lawful course.2 In both criminal and civil cases, and
regarding matters profound and trivial, the exercise of discretion is a core
judicial function.3 The exercise of discretion is often characterized by vivid
metaphors: judges confront a frame of possibilities,4 a zone,5 a range,6 a
doughnut hole,7 two paths or a fork in the road,8 a fenced pasture.9
Above all else, such metaphors convey that the exercise of discretion is
about choice.10 For example, under certain circumstances a judge hearing a
motion for a mistrial could have the discretion to grant or to deny the
motion; the judge could choose either of two paths. In other instances, there
might be a range of available courses of action from which to choose: for
instance, upon a motion to exclude, as cumulative, the testimony of four
additional witnesses, the judge could have discretion to exclude none, one,
two, three, or all four of them. Or the discretion in a given instance could be
a function of two determinants, such as when a sentencing range includes
*
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various combinations of prison terms and probationary periods—a set of
options that the fenced pasture metaphor captures perhaps too well.
The adversarial process encourages litigants to take extreme positions,11
and judges may be generally or somewhat persuaded by an advocate’s
argument in support of a motion yet prefer some intermediate or
compromise position.12 By conferring discretionary authority, the judicial
system entrusts judges with the authority to make sound and informed
judgments about the relative merits of all the various lawful courses of
action that fall within the frame of possibilities.13 The grant of authority is
premised, first, on the notion that the trial judge is in the superior position to
see, hear and evaluate the situation with firsthand knowledge.14 A second
(albeit less exalting) justification recognizes that efficiency and finality in
adjudication may be more important than accuracy in every instance.15 The
“abuse of discretion” standard of review insulates certain exercises of
discretion from rigorous reconsideration on appeal.16
Metaphors notwithstanding, the exercise of judicial discretion does not
always involve a choice among discrete, identifiable options.17 Consider,
for example, the structural injunction: desegregating a school system,18
11
Roger J. Patterson, Dispute Resolution in a World of Alternatives, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 591, 602 (1988)
(noting propensity of adversary system to drive parties to extreme positions); Stephen Landsman, The Decline of
the Adversary System: How the Rhetoric of Swift and Certain Justice Has Affected Adjudication in American
Courts, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 487, 529 (1980) (“Adversary procedure may exacerbate rather than resolve tensions,
and may not foster the kind of compromise essential to the restoration of harmony”); Susskind & Weinstein,
Towards a Theory of Environmental Dispute Resolution, 9 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 311, 319-21 (1980) (“the
adversary system introduces an unfortunate ‘gaming’ aspect to the judicial process that discourages the search for
‘win-win’ solutions to a dispute.”).
12
The obvious advantages find parallels in the justifications favoring ADR, see, e.g., Frank E.A. Sander,
Varieties of Dispute Processing, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 65, 84
(A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979); voluntary cooperation and private settlements, see, e.g., JEROLD
S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW 4 (1983); and plea bargaining, see, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea
Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1975 (1992)..
13
See BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 141 (1978) (1st ed. 1921).
14
Ben F. Overton, The Meaning of Judicial Discretion, in JUDICIAL DISCRETION 1991 8 (National Judicial
College, ABA 1991).
15
Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV.
635, 637 (1971). See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV.
961 (2001); Larry Alexander, Are Procedural Rights Derivative Substantive Rights?, 17 LAW & PHIL. 19, 23-26
(1998); Thomas C. Grey, Procedural Fairness and Substantive Rights, in NOMOS XVIII: DUE PROCESS 182, 184
(J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1977) (stating that procedural fairness favors correct resolution of
disputes, but only “at a cost commensurate with what is at stake in the dispute). See also Ronald Dworkin,
Principle, Policy, Procedure, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 72, 73 (1985) (recognizing that the right to greater
accuracy is a trade-off with cost while arguing that matters of principle should trump considerations of policy in
adjudication); Joseph Raz, Dworkin: A New Link in the Chain, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1103 (1986) (stating that
Dworkin’s procedure essay “seems to undermine Dworkin’s apparent view that in adjudication, rights should take
precedence over issues of public policy, such as administrative expedience”).
16
RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 716-719 (2d ed. 1996). Judicial discretion has many
meanings that extend beyond those invoking the abuse of discretion standard of review. See Marisa Iglesias Vila,
Facing Judicial Discretion (2001).
17
The concept of choice has been widely developed in economic theory within the context of rational action.
The defining features of choice are: voluntariness, preferences, different real possible courses of action, and
mutually exclusive options. See, e.g., S. N. AFRIAT, LOGIC OF CHOICE AND ECONOMIC THEORY (Clarendon
1987).
18
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reforming a prison,19 or disassembling a monopoly20 demands ingenuity and
inventiveness, rather than the wisdom to choose from among a finite set of
options.21 The notion of so-called managerial judging presents another
example; allocating system resources efficiently and shepherding litigants
through the process expeditiously encourages proactive innovation.22
Similarly, judicial exercise of the authority to impose nonmonetary
sanctions may require much creativity.23 In these examples, however, the
tabula rasa must not be confused with carte blanche. Indeed, fear of
judicial activism and of “individualism run riot” has made the exercise of
judicial power in these and similar contexts especially suspect and highly
controversial.24
19

See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE:
HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS (1998); Ronald J. Krotosyznski, Equal Justice Under Law:
The Jurisprudential Legacy of Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr., 109 YALE L.J. 1237, 1242-43 (2000) (describing and
citing examples of Judge Johnson’s supervision of Alabama prisons and mental hospitals through long-term
structural injunctions).
20
See E. Thomas Sullivan, The Jurisprudence of Antitrust Divestiture: The Path Less Traveled, 86 MINN. L.
REV. 565 (2002); Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1 (2001).
21
See generally OWEN FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978); OWEN FISS, INJUNCTIONS ch. 3 (1973);
OWEN FISS & DOUG RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS ch. 9 (2d ed. 1984); Susan Poser, What’s a Judge to Do?
Remedying the Remedy in Institutional Reform Litigation, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1307, 1307-08 (book review)
(summarizing the scholarly literature); Ann Southworth, Lawyers and the “Myth of Rights” in Civil Rights and
Poverty Practice, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 469, 469-73 (1999) (same); William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary
Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 635 (1982).
22
Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 378-380 (1982) (expressing concern over the
potential for judges to abuse their discretionary power under a case management regime); Steven Flanders, Blind
Umpires—A Response to Professor Resnik, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 505 (1984) (defending proactive judicial case
management); Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability
Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day In Court and Jury Trial Commitments, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982
(2003).
23
The contempt power is considered to be uniquely “liable to abuse.” International Union, United Mine
Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 831 (1994) (quoting Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 202 (1968) (quoting Ex
Parte Terry, 128 U.s. 289, 313 (1888))). See Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, Power of Congress over
Procedure in Criminal Contempts in “Inferior” Federal Courts—A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L.
REV. 1010, 1056 (1924) (noting that, in contempt cases, there are “subtle dangers of bias, unconsciously
operating, owing to inevitable human infirmities where one person combines in himself the roles of accuser, trier
of facts and intentions, and judge”).
See Margaret Meriwether Cordray, Contempt Sanctions and the Excessive Fines Clause, 76 N.C. L. REV.
407 (1998); Douglas C. Berman, Coercive Contempt and the Federal Grand Jury, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 735
(1979); Margit Livingston, Disobedience and Contempt, 75 WASH. L. REV. 345 (2000).
24
Authority for this statement creates interesting bedfellows. See John C. Yoo, Race Based Remedies:
Recognizing the Limits of Judicial Remedies: Who Measures the Chancellor’s Foot?, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1121
(1996) (contending that the judiciary lacks the managerial and implementation skills required to enforce
regulatory remedies); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 378-380 (1982) (expressing
concern over the potential for judges to abuse their discretionary power under a case management regime); Louis
S. Raveson, A New Perspective on the Judicial Contempt Power: Recommendations for Reform, 18 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 1 (1990); C. Jeffries, The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 113 (1999);
Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing Organziational Change: Judicial Supervision of Public Institutions, 1983 DUKE
L.J. 1265, 1288-89 (1983); Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 1355,
1406 (1991) (commenting on the failure of the critiques of court involvement in public law remedies to develop
“meaningful standards for limiting the court’s exercise of remedial power”).
See also Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., __ U.S. __, 119 S. Ct. 1961, 1970
(1999) (holding that Congress, not the federal courts, is the proper forum to create new injunctive relief for
creditors); David Zlotnick, Battered Women & Justice Scalia, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 847, 914 (1999) (citing cases
demonstrating Justice Scalia’s hostility to the judicial contempt power).
For the reference to “individualism run riot,” see, ironically, Jack B. Weinstein, Justice and Mercy—Law
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This article focuses on conditional orders—another exercise of the
judicial imagination. As used here, conditions refer to provisions included
in court orders that contemplate the performance of some other act or the
occurrence of some event. For example, a judge might grant a motion to
amend to add a new claim upon the condition that the movant agree not to
seek a postponement of the approaching trial date; or a condition might
require that the nonmoving party be compensated for all costs and
attorney’s fees associated with the new claim. By incorporating conditions
into their orders, judges can impose tailored or compromise solutions that
ensure a more individualized justice. Conditions are thus an effective and
very popular device to mediate a host of competing concerns and interests.
Crucially, however, conditions also test the boundaries of judicial authority.
I will demonstrate that even in circumstances where a judge’s discretion
might be sufficiently broad either to grant or to deny a particular motion,
that discretion is not necessarily so broad as to permit a conditional grant
(or conditional denial). Put another way, the greater does not includes the
lesser. This notion that a condition could impose or induce obligations
beyond a court’s authority has gone largely unnoticed. Although a few
courts and commentators have touched upon discrete aspects of this
phenomenon,25 no one has evaluated the authority to impose conditions as
such. This essay begins to bridge that gap in the literature.
Part II familiarizes the reader with judicially-imposed conditions.
Infinite in number and scope, such conditions can arise in every phase of
any litigation matter. I chart this boundless universe of conditions using an
analytical framework that explores the four primary incentives for judges to
impose or induce conditions. This discussion includes conditions that are
routinely applied by judges as well as those that may be only hypothetical.
Parts III and IV evaluate the use of conditions more broadly and
consider the potential sources of authority for judges to impose them.
Given the utility and ubiquity of conditions, the three sources of authority
are surprisingly deficient or unclear: legislative authorizations are limited in
scope and kind; the inherent authority of courts is largely preempted by
legislative regulation; and party autonomy is a dubious source because
consent may be only nominally voluntary. This want of coherent
comprehensive authority to support the contemporary practice of
conditional orders is a curious phenomenon.
and Equity, 28 N.Y.U. L. REV. 817, 818-19 (1984) (discussing the approach of the nineteenth century French
judges “who abandoned rules of law completely and instead engaged in ad hoc decision-making according to the
equity of the cases.”).
25
The propriety of judicially-imposed conditions have been discussed only in the contexts of addititurs and
remittiurs, see, nn. __ infra; forum non conveniens dismissals, see Comment, Conditioning Forum Non
Conveniens, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 489 (2000); and, tangentially, in the debate about case management, see Judith
Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, __ (2005).
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Finally, Part V locates that phenomenon within a larger jurisprudential
context. Conditional orders offer judges a creative escape from rigid rules
and predictable outcomes. This interplay between the norms of uniformity
and individualized justice evokes the traditions of law and equity. That
conditional orders are a contemporary manifestation of equity is, itself, an
important observation. But even more significant is the suggestion that, in
many instances, the forces of equity are at work even without formal
authority. In a merged system of law and equity, conflict between the goals
of certainty and individual justice has created an ambivalent attitude in the
law toward equity, to which the law is attracted because of the identification
of equity with a general sense of justice, but which the law ultimately
rejects because of the law’s concern for certainty.26 In form, equity is
preserved and codified as discretion, which reflects a shift toward fixed
options and boundaries. However, in practice the spirit of equity may
innovate and create, whether or not authorized. This dissonance invites an
exploration of both cause and cure.
II. EXPLORING USES OF THE CONDITIONAL
This Part describes various types of judicially-imposed conditions. As
suggested in the paragraphs that follow, judges may use conditions to
pursue more or less directly a variety of objectives. These objectives are
clustered into four overlapping categories: (i) conditions reflecting a close
nexus with the criteria for deciding the motion that is precipitating the court
order (“Germane Conditions”); (ii) conditions inspired by notions of
fairness (“Fairness Conditions”); (iii) conditions designed to ensure the
efficient processing of cases (“Efficiency Conditions”); and (iv) conditions
expressing judicial fiat (“Power Conditions”).
The boundaries between these four categories are porous, and
conditional orders presented in one category could instead be presented in
another with minor or perhaps even no modifications to the underlying
facts. My purpose in this Part is not to persuade the reader of which
conditions belong in which categories, but rather to illustrate the range and
force of possible conditions. Possible conditions include those that are
routinely applied by courts, but also those that may be only hypothetical.
Although this Part presents many concrete examples, the broader discussion
about the judicial discretion to condition must contemplate an infinite
number of variations.
In every hypothetical posed below it is assumed that the court has the
discretion to grant in full or to deny outright the underlying motion. Most of
the examples contemplate orders that are derivative of motions filed
26

See Thomas O. Main, ADR: The New Equity, 74 U. CINTI. L. REV. __, __ (2005) (forthcoming).
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pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but this is only for
convenience. Other possible sources in federal court include the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure,27 the Federal Rules of Evidence,28 the Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure,29 the Judicial Code,30 the Criminal Code,31
the Administrative Procedure Act,32 the Federal Arbitration Act,33 the Rules
of Procedure of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation,34 and even the
inherent power of courts.35 State substantive and procedural laws introduce
another tier of motions and orders.36 Indeed, conditions can be induced or
imposed in virtually any court order.
This Part remains agnostic on the issues of judicial authority to impose
or to induce the contemplated conditions. That analysis is reserved for Parts
III and IV.
A. Germane Conditions
Determinations that invoke a court’s discretion often require a court to
consider a variety of factors when making the decision to grant or to deny a
particular motion. If one or more of those underlying factors to be
considered can be mitigated or avoided, the judge may use conditions to
tailor the order to the circumstances presented. Conditions germane to the
decisional criteria can remove obstacles and make the motion easier to
27
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See, e.g., Fed. Rule Crim. P. 21(a) (“Upon the defendant’s motion,
the court must transfer the proceeding against the defendant to another district if the court is satisfied that so great
a prejudice against the defendant exists in the transferring district that the defendant cannot obtain a fair and
impartial trial there.”); Fed. Rule Crim. P. 21(b) (“Upon the defendant’s motion, the court may transfer the
proceeding, or one or more counts, against that defendant to another district for the convenience of the parties and
witnesses and in the interest of justice.”)
28
Federal Rules of Evidence. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 611(a) (“The court shall exercise reasonable control
over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation
and presentation effective for the ascertainment of truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect
witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.”); Fed. R. Evid. 706(a) (“The court may on its own motion
or on the motion of any party enter an order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed, and
may request the parties to submit nominations.”)
29
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. See, e.g., Fed. R. Bankr. Proc. 9006(b)(1) (“[W]hen an act is
required or allowed to be done at or within a specified period by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by
order of court, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or notice
order the period enlarged if the request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or
as extended by a previous order or (2) on motion made after the expiration of the specified period permit the act to
be done where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect.”).
30
Title 28, U.S. Code. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (“The district court of a district in which is filed a case
laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to
any district or division in which it could have been brought.”).
31
Title 18, U.S. Code.
32
Title 5, U.S. Code.
33
Title 9, U.S. Code.
34
See General Rules/Rules for Multidistrict Litigation Under 28 U.S.C. § 1407; Rules for Multicircuit
Petitions for Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a)(3).
35
Forum non conveniens, for example, is derived from inherent powers. See Edward L. Barrett, Jr., The
Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CAL. L. REV. 380 (1947).
36
The issues discussed here could be applicable at the level of state courts, though obviously without the
same federalism concerns. Of course separation of powers issues can also play out differently at the state level.
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decide. Germane conditions may be included in orders granting the
underlying motion (“conditional grants”) or in orders denying the
underlying motion (“conditional denials”).
1. Conditional Grants
In a routine civil litigation dispute, one party may be seeking leave from
the court to exceed certain presumptive limits on discovery. In federal
courts, for example, there is a seven-hour limit on the length of a
deposition.37 The seven-hour limit promotes efficiency and protects against
discovery abuse; but courts may extend the length of the deposition upon
consideration of various factors including the complexity of the case,38 the
density of the subject matter of the deposition,39 and the sincerity of the
parties and persons involved. 40
Upon a motion for leave, a court with discretion to grant or deny this
motion might choose to grant the motion on the condition that the deposing
party restrict the scope of additional questioning to certain enumerated
matters. The conditional order avoids the two extreme positions, which
could have either exposed the deponent to discovery abuse or curtailed
legitimate discovery efforts. Germane to the criteria for deciding the
underlying motion for leave, the condition is designed to ensure the
deposing party a fair opportunity to depose the witness while minimizing
the likelihood that the extended period would be used to abuse the witness
or to delay the litigation. Or, in a similar situation a judge might grant the
motion on the condition that the movant consent that the additional
testimony be taken by telephone or some other remote electronic means.41
Again, the conditional grant strikes a workable compromise between the
extreme positions represented by the grant in full or by the outright denial.
These are classic conditions exemplifying a sensible mandate of modest
scope and nearly universal appeal.
Next, consider a motion to intervene as a matter of right. Assume that
the putative intervenor has a significantly protectable interest that could be
impaired by the ongoing litigation. According to the standard applied by the
courts, a timely motion should be granted unless the applicant’s interest is
37

See FED. R. CIV. P. 30.
See, e.g., Moore v. CVS Corp., 2005 WL 581357 at *2 (W.D. Va. Mar. 11, 2005) (discussing the number
of claims and parties in the case).
39
The Advisory Committee Notes, for example, urge courts to consider, among other factors, whether the
deposition requires language translation, the span of time covered by the events that are the subject of the
deposition, and the number and length of documents about which the deponent is being questioned. Advisory
Committee Note, 192 F.R.D. ___, 395-96 (2000).
40
Miller v. Waseca Medical Ctr., 205 F.R.D. 537, 541-42 (D. Minn. 2002) (noting the deposing party’s
subtle yet obstructionist tactics). See generally 8A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L.
MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2104.1 (2005).
41
Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(7).
38
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adequately represented by existing parties.42 The adequate representation
prong of the analysis may be sufficiently disputed that it would be within
the judge’s discretion either to grant or to deny the motion.43 But both
courses of action have risks: the former could needlessly complicate the
litigation; and the latter could deprive the applicant of the opportunity to
protect their interest.44
Again we see that the judge could select one course of action and then
condition that order to minimize the attendant risk. A conditional grant
might require the intervening defendant to cede some control of the
presentation of his case; conditions could appoint the original defendant’s
attorney as lead counsel and require other forms of coordination.45 Closely
aligned with the underlying criteria for deciding the motion, the condition is
designed to ensure the intervenor the opportunity to participate while
minimizing interference with plaintiff’s prosecution of their case.
Somewhat less benign than the discovery example, the conditional order has
created a hybrid status that may be problematic for the intervenor.46 The
problem is not the condition per se, but rather the fact that the intervenor
may be precluded by this litigation as though he were a party yet his ability
to participate fully as a party could be compromised by the appointment of
lead counsel and other cooperation requirements.47
The forum non conveniens context illustrates well the possibility of
especially ambitious germane conditions. Defendants will often file a
motion to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens where certain
factors suggest that underlying principles of justice and convenience may
favor dismissal in the U.S. court so that the case will be litigated in another
forum. We might assume that certain events giving rise to a particular claim
occurred in a foreign country and that some of the witnesses and evidence
42

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a).
See, e.g., Massachusetts School of Law at Andover, Inc. v. United States, 118 F.3d 776, 779 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (noting “the existence of district court discretion over the timeliness and adequacy of representations issues
under Rule 24(a)(2)).
44
See generally Peter A. Appel, Intervention in Public Law Litigation: The Environemental Paradigm, 78
WASH. U. L.Q. 215, 217 (2000); Carl Tobias, Standing to Intervene, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 415; Cindy Vreeland,
Public Interest Groups, Public Law Litigation, and Federal Rule 24(a), 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 279 (1990); David L.
Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies and Arbitrators, 81 HARV. L. REV. 721 (1968).
45
See generally Byron G. Stier, Resolving the Class Action Crisis: Mass Tort Litigation as Network, 2005
UTAH L. REV. 863 (2005); Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Class Action Lawyers as Lawmakers, 46
ARIZ. L. REV. 733 (2004).
46
See Joan Steinman, Shining a Light in a Dim Corner: Standing to Appeal and the Right to Defend a
Judgment in the Federal Courts, 38 GA. L. REV. 813 (2004).
47
See Columbus-America Discovery Group v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 450 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding it
improper to impose conditions on intervenors of right); 7C FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1922
(questioning propriety of limitations on intervenors of right). But see Advisory Committee Note to Rule 24
(advocating the use of conditions on intervenors of right). See also Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in
Action, 480 U.S. 370, __ (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“restrictions on participation may also be placed on an
intervenor of right and on an original party.”)
See generally ___ (discussing limited participation by parties through appointment of lead counsel,
coordination requirements, etc.).
43
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are still located in that country. According to the requisite standard for a
forum non conveniens dismissal, courts are to consider a variety of factors,
including whether the alternative forum is “adequate.”48 Although the bulk
of factors to be considered might weigh heavily in favor of granting the
motion to dismiss, imagine further that certain rules of procedure and
evidence in the foreign forum call its adequacy into question: strict joinder
rules might handicap cases involving multiple plaintiffs and/or multiple
defendants; discovery essential to the case may not be discoverable; the
statute of limitations may have expired; punitive damages might be
unavailable; the judgment may not be enforceable elsewhere; or the
defendant might enjoy certain immunities. Under these circumstances, the
adequacy of the foreign forum may be sufficiently contested that it would
be within the judge’s discretion either to grant or to deny the motion. 49 But
the former course of action risks injustice for the plaintiff; and the latter
requires litigation in a forum that is inconvenient for the court or the
parties.50
The judge could select one course of action and then condition that
order to minimize the attendant risk. The judge might grant the motion, but
then impose conditions on the dismissal to ensure the adequacy of the
foreign forum. For example, the defendant might be required to disclose
certain evidence as a condition precedent to the dismissal; defendant might
be asked to waive its statute of limitations and immunity defenses in the
foreign forum; and/or the defendant might be obliged to post a bond to
facilitate the enforcement of any judgment awarded by the foreign court. As
with almost all of the illustrated in this Part, the intensity of the condition
can be increased or decreased for effect: the condition could require the
defendant to ensure that plaintiff obtains legal representation; to waive
certain evidentiary objections that it would enjoy in the foreign forum; and
to consent to non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel in future actions by
plaintiffs unable to join as plaintiffs in the foreign suit. The conditional
order is ambitious, and perhaps also insidious, because it creates a novel
hybrid of domestic and foreign practices; the case may be litigated in the

48
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 251-52 (1981). See Monegro v. Rosa, 211 F.3d 509, 513 (9th
Cir. 2000).
49
See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981) (“The forum non conveniens determination is
committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. It may be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of
discretion; where the court has considered all relevant public and private interest factors, and where its balancing
of these factors is reasonable, its decision deserves substantial deference.”). See also Alfadda v. Fenn, 159 F.3d
41, 45 (2d Cir. 1998) (review is “severely cabined”).
50
See, e.g., Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 2001) (en banc) (“The decision to
dismiss a case on forum non conveniens grounds ‘‘lies wholly within the broad discretion of the district court and
may be overturned only when we believe that discretion has been clearly abused.’” (emphasis in original)
(quotation omitted); Sigalas v. Lido Mar., Inc., 776 F.2d 1512, 1519 (11th Cir. 1985) (“We reverse a district
court’s dismissal of a case based on forum non conveniens only for a clear abuse of discretion”).
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foreign forum pursuant to certain procedures and substance dictated by the
U.S. court.
Germane conditions also arise routinely under the criminal law. For
example, a conditional grant would be common in a situation where a
criminal defendant who has been banished from the courtroom for being
disruptive has moved to be readmitted.51 A modest condition could be a
promise from the defendant that he will behave. Or the defendant could
agree to be restrained by shackles not visible to the jury. Or the condition
for readmission could be that the defendant agree to be shackled, gagged,
and surrounded by security personnel.52 Theoretically, of course, the motion
could be granted on the condition that the defendant agree to be placed in a
cage inside the courtroom. Obviously conditions can introduce especial
problems in criminal law given the numerous constitutional safeguards,
such as the right to a fair trial implicated by this example.
Sometimes a condition can enhance the constitutional protections that a
criminal defendant enjoys. Consider, for example, a criminal defendant’s
constitutional right of self-representation.53 When a defendant knowingly
and unequivocally asserts that right within a reasonable time before the
commencement of trial, the court must grant the request.54 The requirement
of timeliness, of course, ensures that the prosecution of the case is not
unfairly prejudiced through assertion of the right. But when the motion is
not timely made, the court may grant the motion on the condition that the
defendant proceed without a continuance.55 In this example the germane
condition resurrects the defendant’s ability to represent himself even though
the Constitutional right had been waived as a result of its tardy assertion.
2. Conditional Denials
This category of germane conditions must also include conditional
orders denying motions. The most familiar example of a conditional denial
may be an additur or remittitur in the context of a new trial motion. A new
trial motion may be granted if the jury’s damage award, in light of the
evidence, is excessive or is inadequate.56 But a re-trial is expensive, given
the additional cost and delay to the parties and to the court. For this reason,
a judge faced with a new trial motion from one of the parties may wish to
51
See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) (upholding a trial judge’s decision to banish a defendant from
the courtroom for unruly, threatening conduct; reversing the Seventh Circuit opinion, which held that the proper
course for the trial judge in treating a disruptive and disrespectful defendant was to restrain the defendant).
52
See Pnina Lahav, The Chicago Conspiracy Trial: Character and Judicial Discretion, 71 U. COLO. L. REV.
1327 (2000).
53
U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818-836 (1975).
54
People v. Welch, 20 Cal.4th 701, 729 (1999).
55
See People v. Windham, 19 Cal.3d 121 (1977).
56
Stephen Landsman, Appellate Courts and Civil Juries, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 873 (2002); Browning-Ferris
Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 279 (1989).
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deny that motion with the condition that the non-moving party accept a
particular damage award. The conditional denial works a compromise
between the extremes of re-trying the case, on one hand, or accepting a
damage verdict that is not supported by the evidence, on the other.
Remittiturs are conditional denials that require plaintiffs to accept a lower
damage award as the price for denying the new trial motion.57 Additurs are
conditional denials that require defendants to agree to pay a higher damage
award.58 In either instance the condition is germane to the criteria for
deciding the underlying motion—to, wit, whether the jury’s verdict is
excessive or is inadequate.
A judge seeking a compromise or intermediate solution to each of the
civil litigation hypotheticals posed in Section 1 above as conditional grants
could instead deny the motion with conditions that mitigate or avoid the
underlying factors to be considered. In the discovery dispute that framed the
first example, the judge might achieve a similar result by denying the
motion to extend the length of the deposition upon the condition that the
party defending the deposition agree not to oppose interrogatories that
might exceed the stated maximum. The discovering party would have the
opportunity for the additional discovery albeit through interrogatories rather
than deposition testimony. And while interrogatories are not immune from
misuse, the opportunity for discovery abuse would be minimized.
In the second example from Section 1, the motion to intervene might be
denied upon the condition that plaintiff and defendant consent to the robust
participation of the putative intervenor as an amicus. That participation
could be further enhanced with conditions requiring the parties to serve the
amicus with copies of all pleadings and discovery, and to allow the amicus
the opportunity to participate in all hearings. The conditional denial, much
like the conditional grant, would establish an intermediate position between
full participation as a party and non-participation.59
In the third example, forum non conveniens, the judge might deny the
motion to dismiss but use conditions to minimize the inconvenience that the
defendant would experience by litigating in the domestic forum. For
example, plaintiff could be required to make certain concessions in order to
replicate certain substantive or procedural advantages that defendant might
have enjoyed in the foreign court. Such conditions could be as benign as
57
See William V. Dorsaneo, III, Reexamining the Right to Trial by Jury, 54 SMU L. REV. 1695, 1727 (2001)
(stating that remittitur is a “practice … widely used by trial courts in the federal system”). See generally Suja A.
Thomas, Re-Examining the Constitutionality of Remittitur Under the Seventh Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 731
(2003);
58
See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486-87 (1935) (holding that judges may order a new trial where the
jury returns a verdict with inadequate damages, but that the Seventh Amendment prohibits the judge from adding
to those damages). See generally Irene Deaville Sann, Remittiturs (and Additurs) in the Federal Courts: An
Evaluation with Suggested Alternatives, 38 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 157 (1987/1988).
59
It is an open question whether the doctrine of claim preclusion would prevent relitigation by an amicus
who participated actively.
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obtaining consent to a litigation timetable that is convenient for the
defendant. Or the conditions could be much more aggressive, requiring
plaintiff to refrain from introducing certain evidence that would be
inadmissible in the foreign forum; to stipulate to certain facts to ensure the
applicability of foreign law; to waive the right to a jury trial; to waive the
right to appeal; and so forth.
3. Antithetical Conditions
One must also anticipate that, in theory even if not in practice, germane
conditions could extend beyond the moderation of a court order toward
outright cancellation. Consider, for example, a motion to dismiss a
complaint on grounds that the civil rights complaint lacked factual
specificity. Defendant might argue that the complaint lacked specific facts
regarding the dates of the offending acts and the identities of the alleged
offenders. The court could deny the motion on the condition that plaintiff
add to her complaint the dates of the offending acts and the identities of the
alleged offenders. Such conditions may be germane to the criteria for
resolving the underlying motion; hence their inclusion in this category of
conditions. Yet these conditions could demand the antithesis of a denial, the
purported mandate of the order. Antithetical conditions do not create a
tailored or compromise solution, but instead simply offer a false choice.
Interestingly, the difference between antithetical conditions and other
germane conditions associated with conditional grants and conditional
denials is a matter only of degree, not kind.
B. Fairness Conditions
Fairness is an express criterion of many motions, and of course is an
implicit part of the exercise of all judicial power. This section considers
conditions that are not necessarily germane to the criteria for deciding the
underlying motion, but rather are derivative of a more contextualized
pursuit of fairness. Fairness conditions can minimize prejudice, protect
vulnerable parties, and deliver just results in each application of a uniform
rule. Three types of fairness conditions are introduced here: reciprocity,
notice, and leveling the playing field.
1. Reciprocity
Judges often condition the grant or denial of a motion on some
assurance of reciprocity from the prevailing party. For example, a judge
could impose or induce a condition that required a party moving for
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additional discovery to agree that that party would accommodate any
similar requests for additional discovery that might later be made by their
adversary.60 The condition would ensure that the adversary enjoyed
reciprocity; and by extracting the condition, the judge might avoid hearing
and deciding a motion later because the parties presumably would stipulate
to the additional discovery without court involvement.61
Not all reciprocity conditions, however, would be as symmetrical or
benign as the previous example. Consider instead a motion for leave to
extend a deposition beyond the presumptive time limit that is granted on the
condition that the movant waive enforcement of any limits on any of their
adversary’s discovery. Moreover, the asymmetry could appear in contexts
with stakes higher than discovery. For example, a motion to amend could be
granted on the condition that the movant consent in advance to any motions
to amend (or, for that matter, any motion at all) that their adversary may
later make.
2. Notice and Opportunity to Cure
Conditions can also be used to notify a party of a court’s intent to take
some particular action and to provide that party with an opportunity to avert
that impending action. This form of condition is affiliated with notions of
fairness, because the court is giving the target of the notice the opportunity
to cure some defect or default.
The most common example of this condition arises in matters of
contempt. Judges frequently issue orders of contempt that are conditioned
on the performance or cessation of some act within a particular period of
time. If the person or entity that is the subject of the conditional order
performs or ceases the act desired by the court, then the condition is not
triggered and the order is rendered nugatory.
Many orders, of course, could include conditions intended to provide
notice and an opportunity to cure. A motion to dismiss for failure to plead
with particularity could be granted on the condition that plaintiff not amend
their complaint to include more particulars within a specified period of
time. Similarly, judges have issued orders granting motions for summary
judgment on the condition that the plaintiff not make available within 90
days affirmative evidence of defendant’s liability.62
The same issues arise in criminal law. A defendant’s motion to stay
sentencing might be granted on the condition that the defendant return to
60
See, e.g., Cynthia Day Wallace, “Extraterritorial” Discovery and U.S. Judicial Assistance: Promoting
Reciprocity or Exacerbating Judiciary Overload?, 37 INT’L LAW 1055, 1057 (2003).
61
See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(2).
62
Mamola v. State of California ex rel. Dept. of Transportaiton, 94 Cal.App.3d 781, 156 Cal.Rptr. 614
(1979).
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court within 90 days with proof that he has attended sixty Narcotics
Anonymous meetings or participated in weekly outpatient psychological
counseling sessions. The condition is thus structured to provide the
defendant with notice and an opportunity to cure.
3. Leveling the Playing Field
Judges might also issue orders with conditions intended to level the
playing field. For example, an order granting a physical examination might
be conditioned upon the selection of an examiner that is suitable to the
examinee. The examinee is certainly not entitled to this privilege; and the
condition may not be germane to criteria for deciding the underlying motion
seeking this discovery. Yet this condition giving the examinee veto power
over the examiner could be included to ensure the examinee a modicum of
dignity in an otherwise potentially humiliating experience.
A judge granting a forum non conveniens dismissal could grant the
motion upon the condition that defendant present no defense to liability.
Even if not intended to address some inadequacy in the foreign forum, the
condition might be included out of a desire to level the playing field
between plaintiff and defendant. The condition could be defendant’s “price”
for obtaining the forum non conveniens dismissal.63
Fairness conditions might also be used to offset some tactical advantage
held by one of the parties. For example, much has been written about the
“legalized blackmail” that class actions can enable.64 Class actions can
create an intense pressure for defendants to settle, and even those
defendants with strong liability defenses may “not wish to roll these dice.”65
To minimize this effect a motion for class certification could be conditioned
upon the class’s abandonment of a claim for punitive damages. Or, the
certification could be granted on the condition that class counsel will pay all
costs of all defendants if the suit is lost.66 These conditions could be wholly
unrelated to the criteria underlying the decision whether to certify the class;
rather it could be motivated by a desire simply to level the playing field.
Fairness conditions need not be limited to issues of fairness between the
parties. Fairness between a lawyer and her client might also be
accomplished through a condition. For example, a criminal defense
63
Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 785 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128
(1981). See also Chhawchharia, v. Boeing Co., 657 F. Supp. 1157, 1163 (S.D. N.Y. 1987) (directing defendant
not to contest liability if the foreign forum rejected its defense of release).
64
See generally HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 120 (1973). William
Simon, Class Actions—Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375 (1972).
65
In the Matter of Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 867 (1995).
66
Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, __ (Duniway, J., concurring) (“Perhaps the class action
order could be conditioned upon an agreement by counsel that they will pay all costs of all defendants if the suit is
lost!”), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
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attorney’s motion to withdraw as counsel could be granted on the condition
that she return a disputed portion of a retainer to the defendant or on the
condition that all discovery material be disclosed to the new attorney within
a specified period of time. In these instances, the condition is leveling the
playing field not between the parties, but rather within the attorney-client
relationship of one party.
Conditions under the “fairness” rubric could, of course, have much
more ambition than the examples offered here and, thus, more potential for
benefit and mischief. Taken to the extreme, conditions could become a
Philosopher’s Stone: a single judge’s notion of what is fair could introduce
myriad conditions interfering with substantive and procedural law, access to
lawyers and courts, the adversarial process, the attorney-client relationship,
and so forth.
C. Efficiency Conditions
This third category regards efforts by judges to use conditions to ensure
the more efficient processing of cases. Few question that delivering prompt
justice is essential to a true system of justice.67 And delay is often perceived
as an institutional problem that can be cured by judges dedicated to the
more efficient management of cases and the processing of claims.68
Conditions are one such efficiency mechanism, with fee-shifting and
streamlining conditions illustrated here.
1. Fee-Shifting or Pay-to-Play
Judges can grant certain motions on the condition that the movant pay
their adversary’s fees and costs associated with the subject of the motion.
For example, a court could issue an order granting a motion for leave to
obtain discovery that extended beyond presumptive limits on the condition
that the moving party pay to the nonmoving party all of the fees and costs
associated with that additional discovery effort.69 This condition is designed
to ensure the moving party the opportunity to engage in discovery while
67
The old adage advises that “Justice delayed is justice denied.” The comment is variously attributed to
William Gladstone or Roscoe Pound. See Martel v. County of Los Angeles, 56 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th Cir. 1995) (en
banc) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (“Roscoe Pound said ‘justice delayed is justice denied …’”); Geo. Walter
Brewing Co. v. Henseleit, 132 N.W. 631, 632 (Wis. 1911) (“Gladstone has truly said: “When the case is proved,
and the hour is come, justice delayed is justice denied.’”); LAURENCE J. PETER, PETER’S QUOTATIONS: IDEAS FOR
OUR TIME 276 (1977) (crediting Gladstone).
68
See Thomas Church, Jr. et al., Justice Delayed: The Pace of Litigation in Urban Trial Courts 5 (1978)
(reporting the findings of eighteen months of research by the National Center for State Courts and the National
Conference of Metropolitan Courts) (“If any one element is essential to the effort to reduce pretrial delay, it is
concern by the court with delay as an institutional and social problem.”).
69
See generally Judge Richard M. Markus, A Better Standard for Reviewing Discretion, 2004 UTAH L. REV.
1279, 1299.
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minimizing the inconvenience and cost incurred by their adversary. The
condition internalizes the costs associated with the motion and thus creates
the incentive for the discovering party (1) to reevaluate whether the
discovery is a worthwhile undertaking; and if so (2) to proceed
expeditiously and efficiently so as to minimize their own expense.
One could also imagine a simple variation of this condition regarding
the recovery of attorney’s fees. The judge could grant a motion for
additional discovery on the condition that their adversary be compensated in
an amount equal to some multiple of the fees and costs associated with that
additional discovery. For example, the motion for leave for additional
discovery could be granted on the condition that the moving party pay to the
nonmoving party an amount equal to 1.5 (or twice or ten) times the amount
of fees and costs associated with that additional discovery effort. The
multiplier incorporates a “pay-to-play” component that imposes an even
greater incentive for the movant to undertake the additional discovery only
if it is necessary and, if so, to proceed with ever greater dispatch.70
Similarly, a judge could also consider a condition requiring payment of a
lump sum. The party’s motion for leave to obtain the additional discovery
could be granted on the condition that the discovering party pay a lump sum
(e.g., $5,000, $50,000, $500,000) to their adversary—or to the court, or
even to a particular charity.
2. Streamlining
In addition to conditions that require the shifting of fees, judges have a
variety of other conditions at their disposal to promote the efficient
processing of litigation. Indeed, any motion that is important to a party can
be a vehicle for the court to impose a condition that streamlines the
litigation.
For example, in a case where a plaintiff is pursuing several theories of
liability, the trial judge may view one of those theories as especially
detrimental to the efficient processing of the case. The claim might be novel
or it might be inadequately supported, even if it could survive challenges
raised by dispositive motions. If this particular claim requires discovery
along lines of inquiry or some other especial treatment that the preferred
claims do not, a judge might target the disfavored claim. Under these
circumstances, the judge might condition any order (no matter its
relatedness to the offending claim) on the abandonment by plaintiff of this
claim. The judge would be using the condition to streamline the litigation.

70
Of course any fee-shifting scenario creates an incentive for the party recovering their fees (and especially
were it some multiple of their fees) to engage in delay tactics.
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Bifurcation is another condition that could be incorporated into an
unrelated order; a court might, for example, condition the grant of a motion
for class certification on the condition that the class adjudicate causation
issues first. The bifurcation condition could be unrelated to the criteria
underlying the decision whether to certify the class, but could be included to
ensure a more efficient processing of the case.
Streamlining conditions can raise a different set of issues in the context
of criminal law. Defendants enjoy a constitutional right to a speedy trial, yet
may also be the party seeking to delay the litigation. Because courts
routinely field motions from defendants and their counsel that could delay
the trial (e.g., motion for continuance, motion to substitute a new attorney,
motion for self-representation), judges may grant those motions on the
condition that the defendant waive his right to a speedy trial. The
conditional order thus does not streamline the immediate litigation, but the
condition (if enforceable) could later streamline the consideration of certain
constitutional challenges in the event that the defendant is convicted.
D. Power Conditions
Of course we must also consider that some conditions could be imposed
for none of the aforementioned reasons, but rather solely for the exercise of
judicial power itself. Ideally this would be a null set in practice, but there is
potential for such a category of conditions.
We might imagine that, for purposes of levity, a judge might require an
outsider to profess affection for the hometown sports team as a condition of
her otherwise favorable ruling.71 More consequential, a judge could deny a
motion for sanctions on the condition that the target of that motion wear a
clown costume in court the following day. Or, notwithstanding the
constitution, a judge could grant a motion on the condition that the
prevailing party express proper appreciation for the ruling by attending a
church service.
Formal requirements to satisfy a judge’s idiosyncrasies are another
category of power conditions. Through conditions, judges could introduce
specifications regarding the form of pleadings, methods of service, conduct
for discovery, reporting requirements, and other technicalities that may be
unassociated with the underlying motion, not intended to effect some
concern for fairness, and unrelated to the efficient processing of the case.
Imagine, for example, a motion to amend the complaint to add a new coplaintiff; that motion could be granted on the condition that plaintiffs refer

71
See generally Associated Press, Judge Asks Killer, Victim’s Family to Say “Go Seahawks,” Feb. 6, 2006,
available at http://www.koin.com/news.asp?ID=2171 (last visited February 7, 2006).
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to that new party for the remainder of the case by some demeaning
nickname that is chosen by the judge.
III. THE DISCRETIONARY WHOLE DOES NOT
NECESSARILY INCLUDE THE CONDITIONAL PARTS
The desire to find some middle ground between the extreme positions
urged by the parties on any particular motion is a noble and worthwhile
effort. A compromise solution may be the most fair and equitable
resolution,72 and the court has a variety of mechanisms to achieve that
result. Sometimes a court may be able to impose an intermediate solution
through a partial grant; for example, a court may award 50% of the fees
requested, or may exclude two of the three witnesses that are the subject of
the movant’s request. In other circumstances, a court may be able to tailor a
solution by granting (or denying) the motion, and then relying on some
alternate source of authority to moderate the effect of that ruling; for
example, the court might grant the plaintiff’s motion to amend, but then as a
separate act at a pre-trial conference use the court’s authority under Federal
Rule 16 to revisit the trial date and allow defendant additional time for
discovery. But the focus of this paper, of course, is a third option: the
conditional. And what authorizes a court to impose or to induce conditions?
One might expect the greater to include the lesser, or the whole to
include the parts.73 But if the authority to condition were always subsumed
entirely within the authority to decide the motion, the judge should be able
72

In certain contexts, the grant of a motion could be the death knell for the litigation. David W. Robertson,
Forum Non Conveniens in America and England: “Rather Fantastic Fiction,” 103 LAW Q. REV. 398, 418 (1987).
73
This deduction is a focal point of debate in several legal contexts. Typically, the reasoning is that
whenever the State can deny a privilege absolutely, then the State may impose any condition on the exercise of
that privilege. Justice Holmes, in particular, is identified with this argument. See Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 53 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“Even in the law the whole generally includes its parts. If
the State may prohibit, it may prohibit with the privilege of avoiding the prohibition in a certain way.”);
Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 511 (1895), aff’d, 167 U.S. 43 (1897) (“For the Legislature absolutely or
conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public park is no more an infringement of the rights of a
member of the public than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house .... [T]he Legislature may end
the right of the public to enter upon the public place by putting an end to the dedication to public uses. So it may
take the lesser step of limiting the public use to certain purposes.”); Frost & Frost Trucking co. v. Railroad
Comm’n, 271 U.S. 583, 602 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("'[T]he power to exclude altogether generally
includes the lesser power to condition ...."') (quoting Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140, 145 (1924); City and
County of Denver v. Denver Union Water Co., 246 U.S. 178, 196-97 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (City may
require water company to close altogether; therefore, it may set water rates at any price.) The syllogism has been
disproven in many contexts. See generally Mitchell N. Berman, Commercial Speech and the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine: A Second Look at “The Greater Includes the Lesser,” 55 VAND. L. REV. 693 (2002);
Thomas Reed Powell, The Right to Work for the State, 16 Colum. L. Rev. 99, 106-12 (1916); Michael Herz,
Justice Byron White and the Argument that the Greater Includes the Lesser, 1994 BYU L. REV. 227, 238-49;
Robert M. O’Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings Attached, 54 CAL. L. REV. 443,
456-63 (1966); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1428-56 (1989);
Peter Westen, Incredible Dilemmas: Conditioning One Constitutional Right on the Forfeiture of Another, 66 Iowa
L. Rev. 741, 745-53 (1981); Peter Westen, The Rueful Rhetoric of “Rights,” 33 UCLA L. REV. 977, 1010-18
(1986); and John D. French, Comment, Unconstitutional Conditions: An Analysis, 50 GEO. L.J. 234, 236-48
(1961).
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to introduce any condition without incurring reversal. Upon review of Part
II all would surely agree as a matter of intuitive judgment that some
conditions could go too far. Setting aside for now consideration of which
conditions are objectionable, one must appreciate that there is consensus on
the point that some conditions may be intolerable—whether because the
condition flouts the Constitution,74 defies common sense,75 is cruel or
unfair,76 invites corruption,77 or otherwise appears to be an abuse use of
judicial power.78 Authority to decide the motion does not necessarily
include the power to impose any condition.
Let us revisit the discretion metaphors, then, in the context of
conditions. Each of those metaphors conveys some notion of choice among
identifiable options. Conditions, however, create an infinite number of
variations of “grants” and “denials” that are not easily accommodated by
fixed or two dimensional concepts such as frames, zones, ranges, doughnut
holes, and fenced pastures. Indeed, none of the discretion metaphors
suggests the incorporation of infinite space that an endless number of
conditions would require. Thus although the grant or denial of the order,
considered alone, is within the frame of possibilities, the attached condition
represents not a judicial choice, but rather judicial creativity operating
outside that frame.
One might envision that conditions introduce a new dimension to the
metaphoric representations of judicial discretion. Consider discretion in a
context where a judge has a range of available courses of action: upon a
motion to exclude the testimony of plaintiff’s four neighbors, the judge
could have discretion under the circumstances to exclude, as cumulative
evidence, none, one, two, three, or all four of the witnesses. If that
discretion is represented in a linear fashion, the frame of possibilities
includes any integer within the 0 — 4 range. However, if a selection from
within the frame is a conditional order, one must invoke some other metric
to sort the permissible from the impermissible conditions: some conditional
orders excluding two of the witnesses may be within the scope of a judge’s
authority, but some may not.
Visually, the 0 — 4 range in this hypothetical could be represented as an
x-axis, with a conditional order excluding two of the witnesses introducing
a y-plane that bisects the x-axis. The y-plane represents the infinite number
of conditions that may be introduced. Using x and y coordinates, then, there
are an infinite number of (2, y) solutions. Where y is a condition that is
permissible, the conditional order is a (2, y) solution that the court should
74

See nn. __ supra and accompanying text.
See nn. __ supra and accompanying text.
See nn. __ supra and accompanying text.
77
See nn. __ supra and accompanying text.
78
See nn. __ supra and accompanying text.
75
76
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uphold. And where y is an impermissible condition, the conditional order is
a (2, y) solution that is unacceptable. Importantly, the authority to impose x
(a selection from the original frame of possibilities) does not necessarily
authorize y (the condition).

y
permissible conditions

x = original frame
0

1

2

3

4

of possibilities

impermissible conditions

In any given instance, the “x–axis” could be a one-dimensional range
(as described and illustrated above), a binary choice (e.g., 0 or 1), or a twoor multi-dimensional plane of options (in instances where the conferred
discretion is a function of more than one determinant). And in each
instance, the infinite number of conditions could be represented by a yplane adding a second dimension (or third or fourth, as the case may be) to
the original frame of possibilities.
A judge’s discretion in a given instance might be sufficiently broad
either to grant in full or to deny outright a motion, but not necessarily so
broad as to permit a conditional grant or denial. Of course the
disaggregation of the authority to condition from the authority to decide the
motion does not necessarily mean that all conditions are impermissible.
Whether a particular conditional order is permissible depends upon whether
the authority to impose the condition can be independently sourced. There
are three possible sources of such authority, and each of those is explored in
the next Part.
IV. SOURCING THE AUTHORITY TO CONDITION
The authority to condition must be derived, if at all, from one of three
principal sources: legislative authorization, the inherent authority of courts,
or consent.79 With regard to the first of these potential sources, the authority
to condition is conferred by the legislature if either (i) the condition is
within the original frame of possibilities; or (ii) some other legislative
enactment authorizes the condition. Many contemporary conditions can be
79
See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86
IOWA L. REV. 735 (2001).
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sourced to properly conferred legislative authority. However, as suggested
below, this authority is limited in scope and kind.
Second, some conditions could be sourced in the inherent authority of
courts. Inherent authority means that scope of authority conferred upon a
trial court, whether state or federal, that is not expressly authorized by the
constitution, statute, or written rule. Inherent powers are a viable source of
authority to condition where rules and statutes are silent.80 Unfortunately,
however, there is much regulatory noise that preempts any definite and
meaningful role for inherent authority in the context of conditional orders.
Finally, the condition could be sourced in a theory of consent or
assession by the parties. This approach suggests that even if the court had
neither the legislative nor inherent authority to introduce the condition, the
parties may nevertheless consent to the terms of the conditional order.
However, because the consent that is obtained in the context of a
conditional order may be only nominally voluntary, this is a dubious source
of authority.
A. Legislative Authority
Under certain circumstances, the conditional order may be sourced to
authority that has been conferred by the legislature to the courts. The
authority of Congress to enact procedural rules for the federal courts is
well-catalogued.81 That authority could be included as part of the authority
to decide the underlying motion; or the authority to condition could be
traceable to some other legislation. That is, either the x-axis contains the
conditional order, or the condition is within the frame of possibilities on a yplane that is, itself, legislatively authorized.
1. Conditions Within the Original Frame of Possibilities
Many of the legislative enactments that prescribe the action to be taken
on the underlying motion will contemplate outcomes with conditions as part
of the original frame of possibilities. Several of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, for example, expressly authorize conditions: in a class action,
the court may “impos[e] conditions on the representative parties”;82
discovery orders may be issued “subject to conditions”;83 dismissals may be
80

FELIX F. STUMPF, INHERENT POWERS OF THE COURTS: SWORD AND SHIELD OF THE JUDICIARY 37 (1994).
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941) (“Congress has undoubted power to regulate the
practice and procedure of federal courts….”); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825). See generally
Karen Nelson Moore, The Supreme Court’s Role in Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 1039 (1993); Ralph U. Whitten, Separation of Powers Restrictions on Judicial Rulemaking: A
Case Study of Federal Rule 4, 40 ME. L. REV. 41, 48 (1988).
82
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(3).
83
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
81
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conditional;84 subpoenas may issue “upon specified conditions” to ensure
the compensation of witnesses;85 new trial motions may be granted or
denied with conditions;86 and courts may grant a motion staying the
execution of judgment with “conditions for the security of the adverse
party.”87 The Advisory Committee Notes that accompany the Rules, a
species of legislative history that may or may not confer additional
authority,88 contemplate conditions in still other contexts.89
Provided the condition to be sourced is the condition contemplated by
the original frame of possibilities, these are easy cases. Federal Rule 19, for
example, expressly authorizes “the shaping of relief, or other measures” to
avoid prejudice in matters involving necessary parties.90 In cases
implicating Rule 19, the pursuit of equitable relief, as opposed to damages,
often heightens the risk of prejudice to parties or nonparties.91 The frame of
possibilities for a judge with discretion to grant or to deny a motion under
Federal Rule 12(b)(7) to dismiss for failure to join a Rule 19 party would
thus appear to include orders with “shaping” conditions; for example, the
Rule 12(b)(7) motion to dismiss could be denied on the condition that the
84

Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(d)(2).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3).
86
Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(c)(1).
87
Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.
88
See Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1103 (2002) (suggesting that, because of the uniqueness of the Congressional delegation
to the Supreme Court of the rulemaking authority, the Courts should accord the Notes “authoritative effect”). Cf.
Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429, 511-512 (2003).
89
See, e.g., 1966 Advisory Committee Note to Rule 23 (“An order embodying a determination [with regard
to certification of the class] can be conditional; the court may rule, for example, that a class action may be
maintained only if the representation is improved through intervention of additional parties of a stated type.”); but
see current version of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(c) (removing this provision). See also 2003 Advisory Committee
Note to Rule 23 (“The terms set for permitting a new opportunity to elect exclusion from the proposed settlement
of a Rule 23(b)(3) class action may address concerns of potential misuse. The court might direct, for example, that
class members who elect exclusion are bound by rulings on the merits made before the settlement was proposed
for approval. Still other terms or conditions may be appropriate.”); 1966 Advisory Committee Note to Rule 24
(“An intervention of right under the amended rule may be subject to appropriate conditions or restrictions
responsive among other things to the requirements of efficient conduct of the proceedings.”); 1991 Advisory
Committee Note to Rule 45 (authorizing court to condition enforcement of a subpoena compelling a non-party
witness to bear substantial expense to attend trial; the traveling non party witness may be entitled to reasonable
compensation for the time and effort entailed); id. (authorizing “court to … condition a subpoena to protect the
person subject to or affected by the subpoena from unnecessary or unduly harmful disclosures of confidential
information.”); id. (“kind of showing required for a conditional denial of a motion to quash as provided in the
final sentence of (c)(3)(B); that requirement is the same as that necessary to secure work product under Rule
26(b)(3). Protects non-party witnesses who may be burdened to to perform the duty to travel; provision requires
court to condition a subpoena requiring travel of more than 100 miles on reasonable compsensation); 2003
Advisory Committee Note to Rule 53 (“The question of present conflicts, and the possibility of future conflicts,
can be considered at the time of appoint [of a Master]. Depending on the circumstances, the judge may consider it
appropriate to impose a non-appearance condition on the lawyer-master, and perhaps on the master’s firm as
well.”). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 71A (contemplating deposits required by law as a condition to the exercise of the
power of eminent domain).
90
See 7 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1609 at
132-133 (2d ed. 1986) (among the court’s options is to “order a pleading amended … when by restructuring the
relief requested plaintiff is able to change the status of an “indispensable” party to that of merely a Rule 19(a)
party or otherwise prevent the ill effects of nonjoinder”).
91
See Martin v. Wilks, __.
85
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plaintiffs abandon their claim for equitable relief.92 The legislativelyconferred x-axis appears to include this and other germane conditions that
would mitigate prejudice.93 The Rule does not however appear to
contemplate any other types of conditions.
Similarly, in the context of consolidating two cases where there exists a
common question of law or fact, Federal Rule 42(a) authorizes “orders
concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or
delay.”94 Although the language contemplates “orders” rather than
conditions, a judge might fairly invoke this authority to condition the order
granting a party’s motion to consolidate. For example, a condition could
require the movant to undertake certain efforts to streamline the
presentation of her case so as to minimize the inconvenience to the other
parties.95 The frame of possibilities thus includes not only grants and
denials of the Rule 42 motion, but also grants with efficiency conditions
that address unnecessary costs or delay.
Notwithstanding these examples, however, the textual authority to grant
or deny motions typically does not contemplate “shaping,” “other orders” or
conditions that might tailor or temper the order. Federal Rule 24(a), for
example, allows intervention as a matter of right under certain
circumstances, but appears to contemplate a binary set of absolute options:
either the motion to intervene should be granted or it should be denied.96
Likewise, Federal Rule 15 appears to indicate that motions to amend will be
granted or they will be denied; there is no mention of conditions or other
middle ground.97 Similarly, if there is no genuine issue of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, then Federal
Rule 56 indicates, without further qualification, that a summary judgment
“shall be rendered forthwith.”98 Or Section 1404 of Title 28, provides that
upon a motion for a change of venue, “a district court may transfer any civil
action”; the statute thus does not appear to contemplate that the motion to
transfer could be granted or denied conditionally.99

92
The 1966 Advisory Committee Note to Rule 19 gives an example of a court that awarded money damages
instead of specific performance when the latter might adversely affect an absent party. Ward v. Deavers, 203 F.2d
72, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
93
For the legislative origins of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see [and/or n. _ infra.]
94
See also FED. R. CIV. P. 20 (authorizing “orders to prevent delay or prejudice”).
95
See City of New York v. Darling-Delaware, Inc., 1976-1 Trade Cases ¶60,812, 1976 WL 1234, at *1 n.1
(S.D.N.Y March 29, 1976) (motion to consolidate was granted on condition that movant withdraw request for a
jury trial and coordinate participation in discovery).
96
By contrast, for permissive intervention the court may be authorized to impose conditions: “In exercising
its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of
the rights of the original parties.” FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b).
97
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (“[A] party may amend the party’s pleading only by leave of court or by written
consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.”)
98
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
99
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
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One might argue that the authority to condition should be inferred from
the grant of authority to decide the motion—that the greater includes the
lesser. Legislative exhortations may even appear to support such inferences:
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for example, are to “be construed and
administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action.”100 To be sure, germane or fairness conditions could better
facilitate the just determination of an action; and efficiency conditions could
expedite and streamline. But practical and Constitutional constraints urge
caution in inferring the authority to condition.101
As a general matter, the courts are hoist by their own petard. The
“legislation” in the context of many conditional orders is a Federal Rule
drafted by the Court rather than Congress.102 As I have demonstrated
elsewhere, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have become increasingly
more elaborate and technical.103 And of course these additional layers of
detailed prescriptions interfere with judicial discretion and flexibility.
Federal Rule 23 is perhaps the most egregious example. Its textual
mandates have been blamed, by judges distancing themselves from
inequitable, unfair, and unfortunate results regarding notice obligations,104
settlement class actions,105 the unavailability of opt-in actions.106 But Rule
23 is not the only such rule.107 Paradoxically, even efforts to enhance
judicial discretion may, in fact, ultimately narrow it. Recent amendments to
Federal Rules 19, 23, 26, 41, 45, 50 and 62, authorize certain types of
conditions; but this level of detail also undermines the legitimacy of an
inference of authority regarding other conditions and other rules.108
100

Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
See notes ___ supra for a discussion of the interaction of Articles I and III of the Constitution.
102
Although the Federal Rules are legislative enactments by virtue of the Rules Enabling Act, they are, as a
matter of fact, drafted by judges. The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules/Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure/Judicial Conference of the United States/The Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2072.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that Congress may delegate to the Court authority to promulgate
procedural rules. As early as 1825, in Wayman v. Southard, the Court held that Congress had full authority to
regulate procedure in the federal courts, but that Congress had also permissibly delegated to the Court procedural
rulemaking authority under the Judiciary Act of 1789. Since 1825, courts routinely have recognized that Congress
has the authority to delegate procedural rulemaking authority to the Supreme Court, that Congress has delegated
that authority to the Supreme Court, most recently pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, and that Congress, by
virtue of its delegation, retains the power to recall that delegation.
103
See Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429 (2003)
(detailing the number, pattern, and length of amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
104
See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (recognizing that their holding may constitute a
death knell for the class action, but holding that “the express language and intent” of the Rule requires individual
notice).
105
In Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 1991 (1997) and in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S.
815 (1999) the Court applied the prerequisites for certification and rejecting class certification even while
acknowledging that the class settlements were both substantively and procedurally fair.
106
See Kern v. Siemens Corp., 393 F.3d 120, 128 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[W]e cannot evisage any circumstances
when Rule 23 would authorize an ‘opt-in’ class in the liability stages of a litigation.”)
107
See Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 Wash. L. Rev. 429 (2003)
(detailing the number, pattern, and length of amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
108
Until 2003, Rule 23(c)(1) allowed “conditional” certifications of class actions. By amendment, the
invitation to conditional certification was removed, and Rule 23(c)(1)(C) instead recognizes that the certification
101
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Because “Congress knew how to draft [a condition] when Congress
wanted to,”109 we should be reluctant to transplant conditions that are
expressly authorized by one rule into some other rule that does not
contemplate conditions.110 When a court rewrites a rule, it rides roughshod
over the democracy’s decision to regulate the event.111 The familiar canon
of statutory construction recognizes that “[w]here Congress includes
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another…, it is
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the
disparate inclusion or exclusion.”112 This standard method of reasoning
applies when comparing provisions within a single statute,113 comparing
related acts over years,114 comparing early versions of an act from what was
eventually passed by Congress,115 comparing different titles of federal
law,116 and generally when reasoning about Congress’ drafting
order may be altered or amended before final judgment in the action.
109
Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 338 (1994) (concluding that an express, codified
household waste exception showed that the statute did not “extend the waste-stream exemption to the product of
such a combined household/nonhazardous-industrial treatment facility.”).
110
See generally Justin Hughes, On the Logic of Suing One’s Customers and the Dilemma of InfringementBased Business Models, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 725, 754-756 (2005) (collecting cites used throughout
this discussion).
111

112
Keene Corp v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993); Rusello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)
(“Had Congress intended to restrict § 1963(a)(1) to an interest in an enterprise, it presumably would have done so
expressly as it did in the immediately following subsection (a)(2).”).
113
Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. at ___; Keene Corp., 508 U.S. at ___; Bailey v. United States,
516 U.S. 137, 150 (1995) (“[18 U.S.C.] § 924(d)(1) demonstrates that Congress knew how to draft a statute to
reach a firearm that was ‘intended to be used.’ In § 924(c)(1), it chose not to include that term….”); Federal
Trade Commission v. Simplicity Pattern, 360 U.S. 55, 66 (1959) (interpreting the Clayton Act, Court concluded
“the only escape Congress has provided for discriminations in services or facilities is the permission to meet
competition as found in the § 2(b) provisio. We cannot supply what Congress has studiously omitted.”); NLRB v.
Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 522-23 (1984) (comparing provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, “Obviously,
Congress knew how to draft an exclusion for collective-bargaining agreements when it wanted to; its failure to do
so in this instance indicates that Congress intended that § 365(a) apply to all collective-bargaining agreements
covered by the NLRA.”); United States v. Edmonds, 80 F.3d 810, 829 (10th Cir. 1996).
114
Neff v. Capital Acquisitions & Mgmt. Co., 352 F.3d 1118, 1121 n.5 (7th Cir. 2003) (comparing Truth in
Lending Act (TILA) and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), the court noted “[s]ignificantly,
Congress thus knew how to write a broader definition of ‘creditor,’ yet chose not to do so in TILA.”); RenteriaGonzalez v. INS, 310 F.3d 825, 834 (5th Cir. 2002) (comparing Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”) which amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), the court
reasoned that the older title provisions showed that new exceptions were not intended: “the INA proves that
Congress knew how to write exceptions for certain kinds of post-conviction relief.”).
115
Murphy Exploration & Prod. Co. v. United States DOI, 252 F.3d 473, 486 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (referring to a
provision proposed, but not passed in the final version of the law, the court notes “[t]he legislative history
underscores the point that Congress knew exactly how to write a statute to state that filing a refund request could
trigger an “administrative proceeding.”); Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 211 F.3d
1280, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
116
West Virginia University Hospitals v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991) (comparing cost-shifting provision in 28
U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) [providing for “the reasonable expenses of expert witnesses … and reasonable attorneys
fees”] to the “reasonable attorney’s fee” cost-shifting provision in 42 U.S.C. § 1988); International Union v. Auto
Glass Employees Federal Credit Union, 72 F.3d 1243, 1249 (6th Cir. 1996) (comparing Title 11 and Title 12
provisions to conclude “[t]he fact that Congress revised the Bankruptcy Code in 1984 to exempt collective
bargaining agreements from a contract repudiation provision similar to the provision at issue here simply indicates
to us that Congress knew how to draft such an exemption.”); Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat’l Pension Fund,
39 F.3d 1078, 1083 (10th Cir. 1994) (comparing Title 38 veterans’ benefits with Title 29 ERISA, “Congress knew
how to draft a statute protecting benefits that had left the pension plan, and it did not use similar language with
ERISA section 206(d)(1)”).
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experience.117 This standard Congress-knew-how-to-draft reasoning follows
from the Court’s recognition that it is “our duty to refrain from reading a
phrase into the statute when Congress has left it out.”118
The knew-how-to-draft argument is especially compelling when one
compares the two drafting institutions. In the typical case requiring statutory
interpretation, knowledge is ascribed to Congress even though it is an
institution that is a relatively large group consisting of distracted, diverse,
and transient individuals with generalized knowledge.119 In stark contrast,
the drafters of procedural rules are a small, stable and cohesive group with a
narrow agenda, immense expertise, and no time constraints.120 With the
latter, knowledge and institutional memory are not merely convenient
fictions; they are facts.121
Next, inferring the authority to condition from the hortatory language of
Rule 1 would be an unprecedented use of that Rule. Federal Rule 1
articulates the “scope and purpose” of the Federal Rules with the modest
prescription that the exercise of discretionary authority pursuant to “[t]hese
rules” be undertaken in a manner that advances the universal goals of just,
speedy and inexpensive determinations.122 This exhortation thus would
seem to apply to the exercise of discretion within the frame of possibilities
117

Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 208 F.3d 871, 884 (10th Cir. 2000) (declining to find an Indian Nation
exception to federal wagering excise tax because “[h]ad Congress intended to provide tribes with an exemption
from the federal wagering excise taxes, it clearly knew how to draft such an exemption.”). The Congress-knewhow-to-draft argument is also a regular move of legal scholars. See, e.g., Mark Rosen, Root of Formalism:
Nonformalistic Law in Time and Space, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 622, 625 (1999) (“The fact that a few provisions of the
antitrust statutes do employ formalistic rules underscores the significance of Congress’s decision to adopt, for the
most part, nonformalistic antitrust law, for it establishes that Congress knew how to draft formalistic rules when it
wanted to.”).
118
See Keene Corp., 508 U.S. at 207.
119
See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990) (analyzing
Justice Scalia's plain meaning interpretation of statutes, which eschews any effort to discern Congressional intent
and focuses almost exclusively on statutory language); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative
Interpretaions of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517 (contending that "quest for ... legislative intent is probably a
wild-goose chase [because] Congress [ [ [probably] didn't think about the matter at all").
120
See generally Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic
Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887 (1999); Peter G. McCabe, Renewal of the Federal
Rulemaking Process, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1655 (1995).
121
With regard to the fiction in the context of Congress, see David B. Rodriguez, Statutory Interpretation
and Political Advantage, 12 INT’L REV. & ECON. 271, 220 (1992)("What legitimizes legislative history as a
source of legislative intent is not so much the probative value of this history, but instead, the democratic fiction
that the history of a statute has been accepted by Congress as a body. Congress should be understood, so this
argument goes, to vote upon a legislative package (text + history) and not merely the text alone."); see also
Edward O. Correia, A Legislative Conception of Legislative Supremacy, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1129, 1156
(1992) (noting "legislators view legislative 'intent' as the policies represented in the statutory text and explained by
the legislative leaders for any particular bill"); James M. Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation," 43 HARV.
L. REV. 886, 888-89 (1930) ("Through the committee report, the explanation of the committee chairman, and
otherwise, a mere expression of assent becomes in reality a concurrence in the expressed views of another.");
Jeremy Waldron, Legislators' Intentions and Unintentional Legislation, in Law and Interpretation 355-56 (Andrei
Marmor ed., 1995) (under this theory legislative history becomes like text--it matters not why the person voted for
it (even if they were mistaken), the words bind them).
122
Interestingly, the words “and administered” were added to Fed. R. Civ. P. by 1993 amendment. In the
Advisory Committee Note, the drafters noted that the amendment recognized that judges had an “affirmative
duty,” but that duty extends only “to exercise the authority conferred by these rules.”
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(i.e., along the x-axis), not outside it. Occasionally Rule 1 is cited in the
context of resolving a lacunae or nonexistent norm.123 Rule 1 is also cited
intermittently as an additional justification for the straightforward
application of another procedural rule.124 Similarly courts also will justify
particular applications of procedural rules by referring to the “spirit” of the
Federal Rules.125 But citations to Rule 1 for the purpose of avoiding the
straightforward application of some Federal Rule are rare and unremarkable
exceptions that prove the rule.126
Of course the system’s overactive rulemaking gland already discussed
neutralizes any prospect that the hortatory language of Federal Rule 1 could
be transformed into a source of authority to condition. 127 Although many
123

See, e.g., D.L. v. Unified Sch. Dist., No. 497, 2002 WL 31296445, at *2 (D. Kan. Oct. 1, 2002) (“Though
Rule 59(e) is silent as to whether the court may order such relief on its own initiative, the Eleventh Circuit has
interpreted the rule’s silence to be without significance, given the court’s inherent powers … Fed. R. Civ. P. 1”);
W. Res., Inc. v. Union Pac. R. Co., 2002 WL 1822432, at *2 (D. Kan. Jul. 23, 2002) (“given the textual ambiguity
of Rule 45 combined with the repeated attempts of the Plaintiff to effectuate personal service, and the cost and
delay that would result by requiring further attempts at such service, this Court thus joins those holding that
effective service under Rule 45 is not limited to personal service”) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 1); U.S. v. Star
Scientific, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 2d 482, 484-85 (D. Md 2002) (“The language of Rule 45 clearly contemplates that
the court enforcing a subpoena will be the court that issued the subpoena. However, this language must be read in
light of the underlying purposes of the rule, which include ‘protect[ing] … persons who are required to assist the
court by giving information and evidence….”) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 45, Advisory Committee Notes, 1991
Amendment, citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 1).
124
See, e.g., Wells v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 2002 WL 1610902, at *3-*4 (S.D. Miss. June 25, 2002) (citing
Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 in support of its conclusion to transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404); Menasha Corp. v. News
Am. Mark. In-Store, Inc., 2002 WL 664067, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 23, 2002) (“apply[ing] Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 in light
of Fed. R. Civ. P. 1’s mandate”). The U.S. Supreme Court cited Rule in this context in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (“Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural
shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed ‘to secure the just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.”).
125
See, e.g., United States on behalf of Mar. Admin. v. Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 889 F.2d 1248,
1254 (2d Cir. 1989) (discretion of the Court with regard to motions seeking leave to amend “must be exercised in
terms of a justifying reason or reasons consonant with the liberalizing ‘spirit of the Federal Rules’”); Nieto v.
Kappor, 210 F.R.D. 244, 246 (D.N.M. 2002) (“outright refusal to grant the leave [to amend] without any
justifying reason appearing for the denial is not an exercise of discretion; it is merely abuse of that discretion and
inconsistent with the spirit of the Federal Rules”) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)); Hurlburt
v. Zaunbrecher, 169 F.R.D. 258, 260 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (putting defendant on notice “that, although she is
technically entitled to insist upon service in strict compliance with Rule 4(e), in the opinion of the court such
insistence violates the spirit of the Federal Rules as expressed in Rules 1 and 4(d)”); Hartley Parker, Inc. v. Fl.
Beverage Corp., 348 F.2d 161, 163 (5th Cir. 1965) (court refused to reverse judgment on ground that failure to
verify answers to admissions under Rule 36 resulted in technical admission of truth of statements, particularly
when proof clearly refuted truth of any such admissions; “the spirit of the federal practice [is] to accord substantial
justice over mere technical contentions”); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Beard, 45 F.R.D. 523, 525 (D.S.C. 1968)
(“spirit of the federal rules” contemplates avoidance of circuity or multiplicity of litigation); Gonzales v. Sec. Of
the Air Force, 824 F.3d 392, 396 (5th Cir.) (Brown, J., dissenting) (stating that it is “contrary to the spirit of
Federal Rule 1” to require the plaintiff to file and serve the defendant within the 30-day statutory time limit when
the statutet makes no mention of service), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 969 (1987).
126
See In re Simon II Litigation, 211 F.R.D. 86 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (Weinstein, J.) (using FRCP 1 in
conjunction with equitable maxim that ensures where there is a wrong there is a remedy); Tyson v. City of
Sunnyvale, 159 F.R.D. 528 (D. Cal. 1995) (just, speedy, and inexpensive determination requires that court
exercise its discretion to extend the time period for serving process when process was served one day late); TPI
Corp. v. Merch. Mart of S.C., Inc., 61 F.R.D. 684, 692 (D.S.C. 1974) (notwithstanding considerable contrary
authority, court permitted permissive intervention because justice required that the party requesting intervention
be granted it); Rollerblade, Inc. v. Rappelfeld, 165 F.R.D. 92, 95 (D. Minn. 1995) (extending time for service of
process under Rule 4(m)).
127
See, e.g., Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 176 ("Congress knew how to impose aiding and abetting liability
when it chose to do so"); Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 650 (1988) ("When Congress wished to create such
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commentators, including myself, have urged judges to engage in a
purposive and dynamic reading of the Rules,128 the rulemaking process
must also be respected.129 Certain rules already authorize certain conditions.
Failure to use the Rules Enabling Act procedure to expand that authority to
condition circumvents the congressional oversight and feedback envisioned
by the legislation. Accordingly, while some conditions will be included
within the original frame of possibilities, many others will not. Conditions
that are not within the original frame of possibilities are not necessarily
impermissible. However, conditions that are not on the original x-axis
introduce a y-plane that, if legitimate, must be sourced to some other
authority.
2. Conditions Authorized by Other Legislation
In certain contexts, some other legislative enactment could expressly
authorize the condition. For example, if a plaintiff moves to amend his
complaint to add an additional party in federal court, the court must
consider, inter alia, whether “justice so requires” allowing the
amendment.130 Under the circumstances the court may have discretion to
grant or to deny the motion to amend; and Federal Rule 15 does not
expressly authorize conditions. With this example, the x-axis contains only
the binary options to deny (x=0) or to grant (x=1), with no accommodation
for conditions. Nevertheless, the court might grant the motion on the
condition y that plaintiff agree that the case be transferred to the Northern
District of Florida, a forum where the case originally could have been
brought. In this instance, authority to decide the underlying motion is
conferred by Federal Rule 15, with the authority to impose condition y
conferred, if at all, by 28 U.S.C. § 1404. Provided the condition is within
the “frame of possibilities” conferred by the legislature for a Section 1404
transfer, the conditional order (x,y) is legislatively authorized by Federal
Rule 15 and 28 U.S.C. § 1404, respectively.
But few conditions appear to fit within this category. For example,
germane conditions modify the criteria underlying the principal motion and
liability it had little trouble doing so); Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S., at 734 ("When Congress wished to provide a
remedy to those who neither purchase nor sell securities, it had little trouble in doing so expressly").
128
Karen Nelson Moore, The Supreme Court’s Role in Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 1039 (1993); See, e.g, Joseph P. Bauer, Schiavone: An Un-Fortune-ate Illustration of the Supreme
Court’s Role as Interpreter of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 720, 720 (1988)
(arguing that because the Supreme Court promulgates the Rules, federal courts are “fully justified in taking an
expansive view of the Federal Rule under scrutiny, giving it a liberal reading if that is required to fulfill the
purposes of the Rule or to do justice between the parties before the court”); Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity
and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429, __ (2003).
129
Catherine A. Struve, ___, (arguing that paradoxically, “Congress’s delegation of rulemaking authority
should constrain, rather than liberate, courts’ interpretation of the rules”).
130
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
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thus, almost by definition, are not themselves motions that could be sourced
to some independent authority. Some conditions might be related to an
existing rule but are not authorized by that rule. Efficiency conditions, for
example, may impose fee-shifting but are unlikely to be authorized by Rule
11, which has specific conduct triggers,131 detailed procedures,132 and an
institutionalized bias against “fee-shifting.”133
Some conditions could be authorized by Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 16 and 26, which authorize trial courts to exercise certain
managerial control over civil cases.134 Federal Rule 16, for example, confers
considerable authority provided it is exercised at a pre-trial conference
“under this rule.”135 Federal Rule 26 confers authority to police the scope
and amount of discovery under certain circumstances.136 Accordingly, if on
131
Under subdivision (c) of Rule 11, the court “may … impose an appropriate sanction” when “subdivision
(b) has been violated.” Subdivision (b) provides as follows:

(b) Representations to Court
By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or
other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and
belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,—
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to
have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably
based on a lack of information or belief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.

132
Although sanctions initiated upon the court’s initiative need not comply with the safe harbor provisions
applicable to sanctions initiated upon motion by a party, “[m]onetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court’s
initiative unless the court isues its order to show cause.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2)(B). Also, “[w]hen imposing
sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the
basis for the sanction imposed.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(3).
133
Subdivision (c)(2) of Federal Rule 11 emphasizes, first, a general limiting principle that the sanction
imposed “shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others
similarly situated.” Next, the Rule emphasizes the availability of nonmonetary sanctions as an alternative to
monetary sanctions. And then, the Rule states that monetary sanctions would be payable to the court unless “if
imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of some or
all of the reasonable attorneys’ fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
11(c)(2) (emphasis added).
134
Daniel J. Meador, The Inherent Judicial Authority in the Conduct of Civil Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV.
1805, 1806 (1995).
135
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(c). For actions taken at a pre-trial conference, Federal Rule 16 authorizes a judge
to “take appropriate action” regarding a number of enumerated matters pertaining to motion and trial practice,
discovery, and scheduling. The authority includes actions taken a pre-trial conference “with respect to such other
matters as may facilitate the just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(16).
136
Federal Rule 26(b)(2) provides that the court may alter discovery limits and also “the frequency or extent
of use of the discovery methods otherwise permitted under these rules.”
Federal Rule 26(c) provides that “upon motion” the court “may make any order which justice requires to
protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one
or more of the following: (1) that the disclosure or discovery not be had; (2) that the disclosure or discovery may
be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation of the time or place; (3) that the discovery
may be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery; (4) that certain
matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the disclosure or discovery be limited to certain matters; (5) that
discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the court; (6) that a deposition, after
being sealed, be opened only by order of the court; (7) that a trade secret or other confidential research,
development, or commercial information not be revealed or be revealed only in a designated way; and (8) that the
parties simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as
directed by the court.
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a motion to extend a deposition beyond the presumptive seven-hour limit,
the court granted the motion on a condition that the moving party agree not
to oppose any similar motion filed by their adversary, authority to decide
the motion to extend would be found in Rule 30(d)(2), while the reciprocity
condition could be grounded in the court’s authority to manage discovery
under Federal Rule 26(b)(2) and 26(c). The conditional order (1, y1) could
thus be authorized by Federal Rules 30(d)(2) and 26, respectively. If a
condition y2 instead (or in addition) imposed a fee-shift (or some multiple of
fees) the issue, then would be whether y2 fell within the scope of judicial
authority conferred by some other source. And, as already discussed, such
conditions probably do not.
B. Inherent Authority
Certain conditions may constitute a proper exercise of the inherent
authority of courts. Inherent authority means that scope of authority
conferred upon a trial court, whether state or federal, that is not expressly
authorized by the constitution, statute, or written rule. This authority flows
from the powers possessed by a court simply because it is a court; it is an
authority that inheres in the very nature of a judicial body and requires no
grant of power other than that which creates the court and gives it
jurisdiction.137 The narrow parameters of this jurisprudence make it a
possible but unlikely source of authority for a y–plane introducing
conditions in a given instance.
The Supreme Court has long defined “inherent powers” as those which
“cannot be dispensed with … because they are necessary to the exercise of
all others.”138 The Court has often cautioned that “the extent of these
[inherent] powers must be delimited with care, for there is a danger of
overreaching when one branch of the Government, without benefit of
cooperation or correction from the others, undertakes to define its own
authority.”139 Accordingly, inherent powers extend only to those instances
“necessary to permit the courts to function.”140 As a starting point, then, few
germane, fairness, or efficiency conditions would seem to be absolutely
“necessary.” Modifying the criteria underlying a motion with a germane
condition, for example, would perhaps be better described as constructive or
beneficial. Efficiency conditions, too, might be extremely useful, yet still
not necessary. Some fairness conditions could be truly necessary in
Federal Rule 26(d) provides that a court may “upon motion” alter the timing and sequence of discovery.
137
Daniel J. Meador, The Inherent Judicial Authority in the Conduct of Civil Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV.
1805, 1805 (1995).
138
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (citing U.S. v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 (7 Cranch) U.S.
32, 34 (1812)) (emphasis added).
139
Degen v. U.S., 517 U.S. 820, 823 (citing Roadway Exp., Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980)).
140
Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton, 481 U.S. 787, 819-820 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
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exercise of the judicial task, but certainly not those that are part of the
standard litigation fare. Nevertheless, most judges and commentators would
likely cite “inherent authority” as the contemporary source of authority to
impose or to induce conditions in the ordinary course. But are they right?
The Court has never reconciled precisely how the Constitution
simultaneously limits federal courts (especially as compared to Congress),
yet authorizes them to exercise “inherent authority.”141 Indeed, the
Constitution provides little or no guidance as to how the judiciary should go
about exercising its authority in the ordinary course.142 The Justices have
generally avoided the larger Constitutional questions by focusing on the
individual inherent power involved in each case.143 The parameters of
inherent judicial authority seem narrow given the “necessity” definition and
the Court’s frequent admonition that it be exercised cautiously.144 Yet
federal judges have repeatedly cited “inherent powers” as a catch-phrase to
rationalize a wide range of actions that may be beneficial but are not truly
essential to the proper exercise of judicial authority.145
Although unclear in its scope, the authority to “manage litigation” is
often listed among the inherent powers of federal courts.146 This authority is
usually traced to Link v. Wabash Railroad, a case in which the district court
invoked inherent authority to dismiss the case when the plaintiff’s counsel
failed to appear at a pre-trial conference.147 In upholding the district court’s
141

“Any judicial invocation of inherent power … seems to clash with three principles of constitutional structure
that the Court has long endorsed. First, the American government is founded upon a written Constitution
that enumerates and limits the powers of each department, with particularly stringent restrictions placed on
the judiciary. Second, the … Constitution vests Congress with full power over the judiciary’s structure,
jurisdiction, and operations. Third, … Congress makes federal law, both substantive and procedural, which
judges merely interpret and apply.”
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV.
735, 739 (2001).
142
Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Judicial Review 16 (1914) (regarding “what the [judicial] power is,
what are its intrinsic nature and scope, [the Constitution] says not a word.”)
143
Pushaw, supra n. __ at 739-40.
144
See, e.g., Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823 (1996) (“Principles of deference counsel restraint in
resorting to inherent power….”).
145
See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution,
86 IOWA L. REV. 735 (2001); Elizabeth T. Lear, Congress, The Federal Courts and Forum Non Conveniens:
Friction on the Frontier of the Inherent Power, ___ (forthcoming). See also William W. Van Alstyne, The Role of
Congress in Determining Incidental Powers of the President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the
Horizontal Effect of the Sweeping Clause, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 102, 113 (1976) (noting that the tone of
opinions evaluating “helpful or appropriate” uses of the inherent power, versus those claiming to be rooted to a
specific constitutional grant, is not “legal”; there is very little “law” to speak of and the decisions “read no more
‘judicially’ than a good congressional committee report, because is essentially what [they are].”)
146
See, e.g., James Wheaton, California Business and Professorial Code Section 17200: The Biggest
Hammer in the Tool Box?, 16 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 421, 433 (2001); Daisy Hurst Floyd, Can the Judge Do
That?—The Need for a Clearer Judicial Role in Settlement, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 45, 58 (1994); Simons, The Manual
for Complex Litigation: More Rules or Mere Recommendations, 62 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 493, 497-98 (1988) (“The
creators of the Manual [for Complex Litigation] remind us that ‘it is not binding law. It has no binding effect. It is
only as good as the credibility of the authors and the utility of the materials.’ The Manual asserts that its
recommendations, like the Federal Rules, are examples of the court’s inherent authority to manage litigation.”)
(quoting Manual for Complex Litigation § 20.1, at 6 (2d ed. 1985)).
147
Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 82 S. Ct. 1386 (1962).
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inherent authority, the Supreme Court described the district court’s power to
dismiss as one of “ancient origin.”148 The Court found that the power to
dismiss was “necessary in order to prevent undue delays in the disposition
of pending cases and to avoid congestion in the calendars of the District
Courts.”149 The Court found this inherent power to dismiss “governed not
by rule or statute by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their
own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of
cases.”150 Under the “managing litigation” rubric, the inherent powers of a
federal court may also include controlling admission to its bar, disciplining
attorneys who appear before the court, punishing for contempt, vacating a
judgment on proof of fraud, barring disruptive criminal defendants, and
dismissing a case on forum non conveniens grounds.151 But still: what about
germane, fairness and efficiency conditions?
Inherent authority is part of the broader topic of judicial case
management.152 That topic, involving the extent to which a trial court
should affirmatively assert authority—inherent or otherwise—over its
proceedings has sparked much debate in recent decades. Views among
judges, lawyers, and commentators differ as to the degree of “managerial
judging” that is desirable or appropriate.153 At one end of the spectrum,
there are those who believe that the structure and process of a case should
be left largely in the hands of the litigants through the adversary process,
with the judge acting mainly in response to issues churned up by the moves
of the lawyers. At the other end, there are those who endorse vigorous,
affirmative judicial management—especially in the pretrial stage—
diminishing traditional party control in order to reduce expense and delay.
That policy debate need not be joined here. Rather, the issue is the extent to
which the inherent power of courts may extend to the introduction of
conditions into court orders.
Although there exists an absolute core of judicial power that is immune
from congressional regulation,154 the Court has long acknowledged that
148

Link, 370 U.S. at 630, 82 S. Ct. at 1388.
Link, 370 U.S. at 629, 82 S. Ct. at 1388.
150
Link, 370 U.S. at 630-31, 82 S. Ct. at 1389.
151
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44, 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2132 (1991).
152
Daniel J. Meador, The Inherent Judicial Authority in the Conduct of Civil Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV.
1805, 1805 (1995).
153
Compare Robert F. Peckham, The Federal Judge as Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case
from Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL. L. REV. 770 (1981) (endorsing managerial judging for increasing the
productivity of the federal courts) with Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982)
(criticizing managerial judging).
154
The power to condition is certainly not among the core inherent powers that encompass the constitutional
duty to independently adjudicate cases and controversies. Pushaw, Inherent Power, supra note __ at 844 (“This
pure ‘judicial power’ consists of applying pre-existing law to the facts in a particular case, then rendering a final,
binding judgment.”); Evan Caminker, Allocating the Judicial Power in a “Unified” Judiciary,” 78 TEX. L. REV.
1513, 1518-1521 (discussing contours of adjudicatory power). See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211
(1995) (holding unconstitutional congressional attempt to require courts to reconsider final judgment under
Securities Exchange Act); see also U.S. v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 144-147 (1871) (holding unconstitutional
149
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most of its inherent authority is subject to partial or complete legislative
control.155 Article I vests in Congress the rulemaking power,156 and a court
cannot exercise its inherent authority in violation of a valid rule.157 Indeed,
the very purpose of inherent powers are to ensure “that the adjudicative
process can function” when rules and statutes are silent.158 Much of the
jurisprudence of inherent powers thus regards the exercise of judicial
authority in the absence of congressional regulation.159 Accordingly, no
matter how useful and practical a device the condition could be, the
promulgation of a rule and its contemplated frame of possibilities may
preempt the exercise of inherent authority to condition.
The scope of the inherent authority to condition, then, may be inversely
related to the degree of particularity and comprehensiveness in the source of
authority to decide the underlying motion. This line of argument tracks
much of the previous discussion about the limited ability to infer legislative
authority to condition in contexts where there is already legislative noise.
Here, too, statutes or rules that are less comprehensive would allow greater
room for a trial court’s exercise of inherent authority to condition. And once
again: more detailed schemata like the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
tend to foreclose that authority. Inherent authority, the thinking goes, is less
necessary when the rules themselves are comprehensive.160
Even where there is regulation, in certain very limited contexts the
Court has recognized inherent authority that complements that regulation.
In Link, the Court recognized inherent power notwithstanding a Federal
Rule that was on point but did not authorize the district court’s action.161
Federal Rule 41 authorized a dismissal for non-prosecution upon motion by
congressional statute which attempted to define the scope of presidential pardon power and to dictate outcome in
pending case).
155
Elizabeth T. Lear, Congress, the Federal Courts and Forum Non Conveniens: Friction on the Frontier of
the Inherent Power, _____ (forthcoming) (draft manuscript on file with author); Dickerson v. United States, __
U.S. __, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2332 (2000) (“Congress retains the ultimate authority to modify or set aside any
judicially created rules of evidence and procedure that are not required by the Constitution.”); See, e.g.,
Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, 266 U.S. 42, 66 (1924) (“[T]he attributes which inhere to the
contempt power are inseparable from it can neither be abroaged nor rendered practically inoperative [by
Congress]. That it may be regulated within limits not precisely defined may not be doubted.”); Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 47-49 (1991) (finding that the sanctioning authority of the courts was not foreclosed by
the adoption of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11); Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton, 481 U.S. 787, 799
(1987) (“The manner in which the court’s prosecution of contempt is exercised therefore may be regulated by
Congress.”). See also Pushaw, supra n. __ at 848 (“the Constitution should be construed as allowing only
legislation that facilitates the courts’ exercise of their implied indispensable powers or that reasonably regulates
minor details of such powers”); David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress’ Power Regarding the Judicial
Branch, 1999 B.Y.U. L. REV. 75, 80, 104-32 (1999).
156
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825).
157
Daniel J. Meador, The Inherent Judicial Authority in the Conduct of Civil Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV.
1805, 1816 (1995).
158
FELIX F. STUMPF, INHERENT POWERS OF THE COURTS: SWORD AND SHIELD OF THE JUDICIARY 37 (1994).
159
See Ex Parte Patterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920); Cash v. Riggens Trucking, 757 F.2d 557, 563-64 (3rd
Cir. 1985) (en banc).
160
The fallibility of that reasoning, see Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure,
78 WASH. L. REV. 429 (2003), does not affect the issues of authority addressed here.
161
See nn. __ supra and accompanying text.
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the defendant; and the Court recognized inherent authority to dismiss sua
sponte.162 The Court noted the “ancient origin” of the dismissal right and
emphasized that the Federal Rule did not clearly express congressional
intent to abrogate the federal courts’ traditional inherent authority to dismiss
for want of prosecution on their own.163
Similarly, the Court recognized an inherent authority to sanction
notwithstanding certain legislative authority already in place. In Chambers
v. NASCO, Inc., one party tried to deprive the district court of jurisdiction
through various fraudulent and bad-faith actions.164 The trial court invoked
its inherent authority to sanction this conduct by ordering Chambers to pay
all of their adversary’s fees, and the Supreme Court affirmed.165 The Court
held that the sanctioning provisions in federal statutes and procedural rules,
which “reache[d] only certain individuals or conduct,” did not displace the
inherent sanctioning power, which “extend[ed] to a full range of litigation
abuses.”166 Although the Court acknowledged the legislature’s right to limit
inherent authority, it would “not lightly assume that Congress ha[d]
intended to depart from established principles” (the longstanding precedent
recognizing inherent sanctioning power) by approving the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.167 “[I]f in the informed discretion of the court, neither the
statute nor the Rules are up to the task, the court may safely rely on its
inherent power.”168 While conceding that many of Chambers’s actions
could have been sanctioned under existing laws, the Court concluded that
such conduct was intertwined with behavior that fell outside their scope.169
One might fairly argue, then, that even in contexts where there is
regulatory noise, inherent powers may authorize complementary conditions
of “ancient origin”. But of course this is a rather onerous standard. Both
Link and Chambers regarded a court’s indispensable authority to impose
order, respect, decorum, silence and compliance with lawful mandates.
162

See nn. __ supra and accompanying text.
370 U.S. 626, 629-633 (1962). The Court characterized a dismissal for lack of prosecution as “of ancient
origin, having its roots judgments of nonsuit and non prosequitur entered at common law.” Id. at 630 (citing 3
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 295-96, 451 (1768)).
164
501 U.S. 32, 35-39 (1991)
165
501 U.S. at 42-58. The Court began its opinion by reiterating that federal judges necessarily had the
inherent power to manage their proceedings and control the conduct of those who appeared before them. Id at 4344. See also id. at 44, 50 (cautioning that such authority should be exercised with restraint).
166
501 U.S. at 46. For instance, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 authorized the award of attorneys’ fees only against
lawyers who vexatiously multiplied proceedings. It did not cover parties who had done so, and did not reach other
attorney misconduct, such as lying to the court. Id. at 41-42.
167
501 U.S. at 47. For example, the Court maintained that the 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules
addressing sanctions (most notably Rule 11) sought only to supplement, not displace, the courts’ existing inherent
power to deal with litigation abuses. Id. at 48-49 (citing sources). The Court also cited the Advisory Committee
Notets, which indicated that the amended sanctioning provisions were designed “to obviate dependence upon …
the court’s inherent power” as demonstrating “no indication of an intent to displace the inherent power.” Id. at 48
n.13 (citing sources).
168
501 U.S. at 50.
169
501 U.S. at 50-51.
163

6-Apr-06

Judicial Discretion To Condition

35

Some germane, efficiency or fairness conditions may tap this deep ancient
root, but most contemporary conditions instead tinker at the surface.
Inherent authority may authorize certain conditions in particular
instances, but it fails as a broad source of authority for two reasons. First,
the jurisprudence of inherent powers is purposely narrow: “inherent powers
are the exception, not the rule, and their assertion requires special
justification in each case.”170 The rules are framed through a process that
strikes a delicate balance between the needs of efficiency in litigation and
the rights of the parties. Imposing conditions could frustrate Congress’s will
and infringe the Due Process rights of the plaintiff, who may have no fair
notice that the court could impose such conditions. Second, even if one
assumes a broader view of the inherent authority of courts, that authority
can be preempted by legislative interference. Accordingly, in instances
where there is regulatory noise, inherent authority is even more suspect.
C. Consent
One might argue that a condition requires no judicial authority because
the condition can always be declined by the party faced with the condition.
This argument would emphasize that, for example, a deposing party seeking
additional discovery by way of motion would have a choice: proceed with
the deposition under the prescribed conditions (e.g., paying their
adversary’s additional attorney’s fees) or abandon the motion. Therefore, if
the party accepted the condition, the court does not require any authority to
impose or induce the condition. In other words, the y-plane is introduced as
function of party autonomy. However, because consent may not be
voluntary in these contexts, inducing conditions without institutional
authority makes consent a dubious source of authority.
Consent is valid only if it is not coerced. Judges enjoy significant
leverage over the parties in the context of a pending motion, and thus can
extract concessions that may be only nominally voluntary. Moving parties
who accept conditions would likely do so because the alternative to the
condition is that their motion will be denied outright.171 From this
perspective, the conditional order looks like an offer most movants would
be silly to refuse. For this reason, most conditional offers probably are
“accepted.” But acceptance here is a product of the court’s power, not its
authority.172

170

Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 63 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Of course, for nonmoving parties who “accept” conditional denials the threat is that their adversary’s
motion will be granted in full.
172
See generally Joseph Raz, Legitimate Authority, in The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality 3,
19-25 (1976) (discussing necessity of distinction to prevent “endless confusion” on questions of legitimacy).
171
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Consider this simple non-legal example. A student asks a former
professor to accompany her to lunch. The professor responds that she will
join upon the condition that the student pay. The professor has no authority
to require that the student pay.173 Yet the circumstances present the
opportunity for the professor to assert power that could effect that result.174
The conditional offer may be “accepted” by the student, but the use of
power without authority may have been exploited. The use of power is a
form of arm-twisting that casts doubt on the voluntariness of that consent.
In the judicial context, the situation is even more troubling since the
exercise of judicial power is not only the exercise of power without
authority, but also a failure to exercise delegated authority. By introducing a
condition that a court is not authorized to induce, the judge avoids (and the
movant is denied) an up-or-down determination on the motion itself.
Passing judgment on the motion is a part of the judicial function that the
judge should not escape; judicial inaction is not within the judge’s
discretion.175 By granting or denying the motion with conditions, the judge
is, in some sense, ruling on a motion that the parties didn’t file; but, more
importantly, it is not ruling on the motion that one of the parties did file.
Even if consenting to the conditional order, the movant has not consented to
not having a ruling on her motion.
Moreover, consent is a dubious basis for because conditional orders may
also not even provide a meaningful opportunity to reject the offer. If a
motion for additional discovery is granted on the condition that the
defendant pay the additional attorneys’ fees associated with that additional
discovery, then the movant can reject the conditional grant by simply not
engaging in the additional discovery. But consider an order dismissing for
lack of proper venue where the order is conditioned upon the waiver of
defendant’s statute of limitations defense if the case is re-filed elsewhere. If
the defendant finds these conditions unacceptable, he cannot simply
abandon the motion. Of course defendant could move to withdraw his
(“successful”) motion or move to vacate the judgment that was entered on
his motion, but either approach would require further litigation and also the
court’s permission.176 The failure to take these affirmative steps—which
would also involve returning the partial victory for the chance at a complete
victory—is an unfamiliar foundation for consent.177 Deriving meaningful
173

Authority is a form of leverage generated by a demonstrably valid right or justification.
See generally Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (1974). See also Robert O. Keohane & Joseph Nye,
Jr., Power and Interdependence in the Information Age, 77 For. Aff. 81, 86-88 (1998) (distinguishing between
“hard” power exercised through threats and rewards and “soft” power exercised through persuasion).
175
See David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 577-78 (1985). See VILA at
10.
176
The withdrawal of a motion ordinarily would require the court’s permission.
177
To bring these issues into further relief, consider the conditional denial of a motion. Imagine that the
motion to dismiss on ground of forum non conveniens is denied on the condition that the litigation will proceed
174
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consent in the context of a conditional denial can be even more
problematic.178
V. CONDITIONS IN CONTEXT
The mismatch between the form and practice of conditional orders is
illustrative of a broader jurisprudential phenomenon. This Part V uses a
wide-angle lens to examine conditional orders within this larger context.
Conditional orders enable a more individualized justice. Germane
conditions can facilitate creative outcomes tailored to the unique
circumstances of the case presented.179 Fairness conditions can minimize
prejudice, protect vulnerable parties, and deliver just results in each
application of a uniform rule.180 And efficiency conditions can help assure
that justice in a particular case is not delayed.181 Whether the flexibility and
tailoring is used constructively or destructively,182 conditions enable judges
to adapt to the circumstances presented and to customize their order.
Profound respect for individualized justice is part of the tremendous
legacy of equity. For centuries the Anglo-American legal system
administered justice through separate systems of law and equity. The law
courts ensured uniformity and predictability, while courts in equity tailored
the substance and procedure to the exigencies of each case.183 Within a
merged system of law and equity, the spirit of equity is reflected in many
important doctrines, traditions, and practices. Much of our contemporary
substantive law, procedural law, and remedial law originated in equity.184
And, perhaps more subtly, the influence of equity is reflected in the
proliferation of broad principles as opposed to narrow rules,185 variable
according to a timetable that is more convenient for the defendants. Is anything short of an “objection” going to
constitute “consent”? Again, the rational act of risk aversion, is a rather dubious foundation for consent.
178
For example, a court might deny a motion to intervene on the condition that the existing parties allow
robust participation by the putative intervenor as an amicus. Have the parties “consented” if they fail then to voice
their objection to the court’s order? Must the parties seek clarification of the court’s intent regarding “robust
participation”?
179
See nn. __ supra and accompanying text.
180
See nn. __ supra and accompanying text.
181
See nn. __ supra and accompanying text.
182
Conditions can unfairly exploit, prejudice, embarrass, bias, and deprive.
183
See Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429, 444
(2003) (“Law and equity approached a given set of facts from opposite angles—invoking distinctive traditions,
applying different reasoning, and pursuing separate aims.”). See generally BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE
OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 65 (1921) (“[W]hen the social needs demand one settlement rather than another, there
are times when we must bend symmetry, ignore history, and sacrifice custom in the pursuit of larger ends.”);
Joseph Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence: As Administered in England and America § 28, at 19 (12th
ed. 1877). See also Toledo, A.A. & N.M. Ry. v. Penn. Co., 54 F. 746, 751 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1893) (“[T]he powers of
a court of equity are as vast, and its processes and procedure as elastic, as all the changing emergencies of
increasingly complex … relations and the protection of rights can demand.”).
184
See Thomas O. Main, ADR: The New Equity, __ U. CINTI. L. REV. __ (2005) (detailing Equity’s legacy
in substantive and procedural law).
185
See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULEBASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 98, 158-162 (1991); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of
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standards of conduct,186 balancing tests,187 lee ways of precedent,188 the
acceptance of legal fictions,189 and broad grants of discretionary
authority.190 Conditional orders can “adjust at one stroke the various
interests of all parties concerned”191 and, thus, are part of this tradition that
favors the specific over the general.
The apparent vitality of equity’s legacy is intriguing in light of other
jurisprudential currents. After all, “judicial activism” is a boogeyman with
whom few choose to associate.192 “For a generation now, candidates for the
federal bench have been expected to ritualistically disavow liberal activism.
As a job criterion, anti-activism is right up there with ‘objectivity’ in the
minds of the public, Congress and, now, the judiciary itself.”193 Judges
overstep their institutional boundary by forsaking “neutral principles,”194
creating policy in an area which should be left for the legislature,195 or by
Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989); Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165
(1985).
186
See generally Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27
STAN. L. REV. 621 (1975); James Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of Law,
51 IND. L.J. 467 (1976); Aaron Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground Between Rules and Standards in Design
Defect Litigation: Advancing Directed Verdict Practice in the Law of Torts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 521 (1982).
187
See generally Robert F. Nagel, Liberals and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 319 (1992); T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987); James G. Wilson, Surveying the
Forms of Doctrine on the Bright Line-Balancing Test Continuum, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773 (1995).
188
See generally Ruggero J. Aldisert, Precedent: What It Is and What It Isn’t: When Do We Kiss It and
When Do We Kill It?, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 605 (1990); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional
Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68 (1991).
189
See generally LON FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 9 (1967); Louise Harmon, Falling Off the Vine: Legal
Fictions and the Doctrine of Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1 (1990); HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT
LAW 17–36 (E.P. Dutton & Co. 1910) (1861).
190
See P.S. Atiyah, From Principles to Pragmatism: Changes in the Function of the Judicial Process and
the Law, 65 IOWA L. REV. 1249, 1251-59 (1980); ALAN PETERSON, THE LAW LORDS 123-24 (1982).
191
Sherman Steele, The Origin and Nature of Equity Jurisprudence, 6 AMER. LAW SCH. REV. 10, 14 (1926).
192
See, e.g., Valerie Bauerlein, Senate Rivals Court Key Voters Down East, News & Observer (Raleigh,
N.C.), Oct. 31, 2004, at A1 (identifying judicial activism as an issue used to motivate North Carolinians to vote in
the hotly-contested U.S. Senate race for John Edwards’ open seat); Editorial, Courting Consistency, Columbus
Dispatch, Nov. 5, 2004, at 10A (applauding voters for effectively putting an end to an era of judicial activism by
the Ohio Supreme Court); Jannell McGrew, Roy Moore Backer Holds Lead, Montgomery Advertiser, Nov. 3,
2004, at A6 (describing the platform of Tom Parker, Alabama Supreme Court candidate, as one of "rein[ing] in
‘judicial activism"‘ on the heels of public protest following the removal of Chief Justice Roy Moore for ignoring a
federal court order to remove a monument of the Ten Commandments from the state Judicial Building); Richard
Ruelas, Judge Unexpectedly Targeted in Political Campaign, Ariz. Republic, Nov. 1, 2004, at 1B (discussing the
tactics of a conservative Arizona political group intended to send a message to judges who are perceived as
"trying to legislate increased abortion access and gay marriage from the bench"); Joan Vennochi, Was Gay
Marriage Kerry’s Undoing?, Boston Globe, Nov. 4, 2004, at A15 (suggesting that the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court played a role in John Kerry’s presidential loss as a result of its approval of same-sex marriage
during his campaign).
193
Myriam Gilles, An Autopsy of the Structural Reform Injunction: Oops … it’s Still Moving, 58 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 143, 145 (2003) (citing David Alistair Yalof, Pursuit of Justices: Presidential Politics and The Selection
of Supreme Court Nominees (1999)).
194
The neutral principle theory suggests that judges should decide cases based on general principles which
are consistently applied in similar cases. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,
73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Intepretivism and
Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983).
195
See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970); KENNETH M.
HOLLAND, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, 1 (Kenneth M. Holland ed., 1991) (“Judicial
activism comes into existence when courts do not confine themselves to adjudication of legal conflicts but
adventure to make social policies….”).
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nullifying legislation.196 The judiciary is constituted only to interpret the
laws, not to make or enforce them.197 And with regard to that particular task
of interpretation, the “rule of law” demands consistency and uniformity
from the judiciary.198
In many respects equity, then, appears to have lost its currency. The
structural reform injunction199—“the most visible and perhaps the most
ambitious exercise of judicial power”200—awaits a eulogy.201 Less
196
See C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT 277-285 (1948) (stating that the “most
perpelexing” dilemma faced by the Roosevelt Court was the “determination of the degree of deference owed by a
liberal bench to the legislative will.”); Bradley C. Canon, A Framework for the Analysis of Judicial Activism in
SUPREME COURT ACTIVISM AND RESTRAINT 385-386 (Stephen C. Halpern & Charles M. Lamb eds., 1982)
(“Classic discussions of activism focused on the nullification of legislation—usually liberal in nature—by
conservative justices.”).
197
The statement that judges should not make law has been something of a mantra for conservatives since
the Warren Court. See Address to the Nation Announcing Intention to Nominate Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and William
H. Rehnquist to be Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1971 Pub. Papers 1053, 1054
(Oct. 21, 1971). See also 144 Cong. Rec. S11,883 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998) (statement of Sen. Thurmond regarding
the nomination of William A. Fletcher to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals) ("I firmly believe that the role of the
judge is to interpret the law as the legislature intended, not to interpret the law consistent with the judge's public
policy objectives. A judge does not make the law and is not a public policy maker."); 144 Cong. Rec. S646 (daily
ed. Feb. 11, 1998) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft regarding the nomination of Margaret M. Morrow to the District
Court for the Central District of California) ("[T]he question is ... whether this candidate will say the legislature is
the place to make the law, and whether she will recognize that courts can only make decisions about the law.");
140 Cong. Rec. 27,526 (1994) (statement of Sen. Gramm regarding the nomination of H. Lee Sarokin to the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals) ("I believe judges ought to be in the business of interpreting laws, not making them.");
140 Cong. Rec. 27,470 (1994) (statement of Sen. Hatch regarding the nomination of H. Lee Sarokin to the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals) ("What are judges for other than to implement the laws, to abide by them, to interpret
them, not to make them."); 140 Cong. Rec. 7509 (1994) (statement of Sen. Hatch regarding the nomination of
Rosemary Barkett to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals) ("[W]e do not need another [judge] who ignores the
laws and starts to put his or her own emotional predilections into the law instead of interpreting the laws made by
elected representatives ...."); 139 Cong. Rec. 18,133 (1993) (statement of Sen. Grassley regarding the nomination
of Ruth Bader Ginsburg to the Supreme Court) ("For me, [judicial restraint] is being very cautious to make sure
you only interpret the law and do not make the law ...."); 137 Cong. Rec. 25,264 (1991) (statement of Sen. Specter
regarding the nomination of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court) ("Justices are supposed to interpret the law
rather than make the law."); 137 Cong. Rec. 23,612 (1991) (statement of Sen. Specter regarding the nomination of
Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court) ("[T]he Court is supposed to interpret law, not to make law."). Cited in
Bernard W. Bell, R-E-S-P-E-C-T: Respecting Legislative Judgments in Interpretive Theory, 78 N.C. L. Rev. 1253
(2000).
198
See, e.g., Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values with SecondLook Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575, 1594 (2001) (“Central to the rule of law is
the notion that judicial decision making must be marked by reason, integrity, and constituency.”); Neil S. Siegel,
State Sovereign Immunity and Stare Decisis: Solving the Prisoners’ Dilemma Within the Court, 89 CAL. L. REV.
1165, 1183-1184 (2001) (“[R]eplicability, stability and consistency in application are values that the ideal of the
rule of law is intended to serve.”).
199
In this remedial regime, the trial judge became the central figure of the entire litigation process by both
determining liability and then fashioning a decree that would achieve the constitutional or regulatory purpose. The
injunctions ordered forward-looking, affirmative steps.
200
OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 18 (1978).
201
“Evidence of the end is everywhere to be seen: On September 25, 2003, Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70
(1995)—a 26-year-old, $2 billion case seeking to desegregate Kansas City public schools that reached the
Supreme Court three times - finally ended. The case was closed when plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their appeal
of the district court’s ruling that the 35,000-student district had met its final goal of closing the achievement gap
between black and white students. Ann Bradley, Kansas City Marks End of Desegregation Case, 10/8/03 Educ.
Wk. 4 (available at 2003 WL 9607526). Although lawyers for the plaintiffs in Missouri v. Jenkins would not
comment on their reasons for dropping the appeal, many observers believe that the appeal was sure to lose,
especially given that both the Eight Circuit and the Supreme Court had expressed exasperation that the case had
dragged on for so long. See also Tresa Baldas, As Large School Districts Leave Court Supervision, Critics See
Resegregation, Nat. L.J., June 16, 2003, at 4. (reporting that school districts across the nation are seeking to be
released from federal supervision under decades-old decrees ordering actions taken to desegregate and provide a
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ambitious forms of equitable relief, too, have been curtailed: federal judges
may not fashion new forms of equitable relief without express
congressional permission, and, even when permission has been granted, that
authority must be read narrowly by judges.202 More and longer procedural
rules suggest regulatory creep.203 And judges are unable to invoke equity or
equitable principles to supplant or override existing procedural rules:
summary jury trials,204 mandatory ADR,205 settlement class actions,206 trialby-statistics,207 and creative contempt sanctions208 are among the many
"unitary," equal education to all students).” Myriam Gilles, An Autopsy of the Structural Reform Injunction: Oops
… it’s Still Moving, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 143, 145 (2003).
202
Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78 Ind.
L.J. 223 (2003) (citing Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 (1999);
Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002)).
203

204
A summary jury trial is a trial of an action usually tried in one day during which each party presents the
facts in a courtroom before a judge and jury for a verdict, usually by the end of the day. It is an expedited means
to have a jury evaluate a case on a binding or nonbonding basis. Judge Thomas Lambros of the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio created this procedure in 1980 in “response to burgeoning court dockets.”
Thomas D. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial: An Effective Aid to Settlement, 77 JUDICATURE 6, 6 (1993). Early
resistance to the technique is illustrated by Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1987); Hume v. M
& C Management, 129 F.R.D. 506, 506 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (holding that court has not authority to use persons as
summary jurors); Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute
Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366 (1986); Shirley A. Wiegand, A New Light
Bulb or the Work of the Devil? A Current Assessment of Summary Jury Trials, 69 OR. L. REV. 87, 115 (1990).
205
The judicial debate hinged primarily on the interpretation of an earlier version of Rule 16. With noncoercive, permissive language earlier Advisory Committee Notes acknowledged, if not encouraged, judges to use
ADR before trial. The Notes did not clearly identify acceptable ADR methods. Courts rejecting mandatory ADR
read Rule 16 and the accompanying notes as limiting the courts’ express and inherent authority rather than
encouraging judicial innovation. Judges could urge litigants to use litigation alternatives, but had no power to
compel them, these courts said. Amid disputes about the scope of judicial authority, demands for faster and less
expensive dispute resolution led to important statutory changes during the l990s, particularly the Civil Justice
Reform Act of l990, which directed federal courts to draft plans for streamlining case processing and resolution—
including making ADR options available to litigants. Rule 16 was also amended in 1993 to include provisions
authorizing certain ADR referrals.
206
See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). This case resulted from an attempt to use a
settlement class action to resolve asbestos liability. This strategy began when all asbestos cases pending in federal
court were enjoined pending issuance of a final order by District Judge Weiner in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. Thereafter, settlement negotiations ensued between the asbestos bar, the insurers, and the tort
defendants. The Center for Claims Resolution (the "CCR"), a facility formed by certain defendants to settle
asbestos claims, indicated that it would be willing to settle, but only if future claims could be resolved as well.
The mechanism decided on to settle future claims was a plaintiffs' class action with respect to all persons who had
not yet filed an asbestos related lawsuit, a simultaneous settlement agreement, and a motion for class certification.
The proposed class would have comprised all persons who had been exposed to asbestos but who had not yet filed
a lawsuit. Upon approval of the settlement, every member of the class would have been barred from suing any
company participating in the CCR. The district court certified the class, but the Third Circuit reversed and the
Supreme Court affirmed. The Supreme Court held that the common issues of exposure to asbestos and not yet
filing a complaint did not predominate over the non-common issues of type of asbestos exposure, type of disease,
history of cigarette smoking, extent of medical expenses, and so on. It also held that the class representatives
could not fairly represent the class members because they had conflicted positions, based on their diverse medical
conditions and whether they had merely been exposed to asbestos or were in fact ill. Finally, notice to class
members could probably not be given fairly because of the latent nature of asbestos exposure, although that issue
was not dispositive to the decision denying class certification.
207
In Cimino ____, Judge Parker certified a class of 3,031 plaintiffs, all of whom had pending asbestos
claims in the Eastern District of Texas. Settlements and dismissals reduced the class to 2,298 claims. Five
defendants that manufactured asbestos products remained in the case at the time of trial.
Judge Parker conducted trials of these cases in three phases. In Phase I, a jury resolved all the issues that were
common to the plaintiffs in the litigation, using procedures that Judge Parker had created and applied--and, most
importantly, the court of appeals had approved--in Jenkins v. Raymark. The issues were whether the asbestos
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judicial innovations once held to be beyond the proper exercise of judicial
authority.209
So has equity won?210 Or lost?211 It should not surprise that the
resolution of the law-equity tension would be complex. A unified system
must reconcile its commitment to equity—or fairness, which is probably the
most important principle of jurisprudence212—with the countervailing
concern for certainty—or uniformity, which may be the most basic principle
products were defective and unreasonably dangerous, whether the warnings were adequate, and whether the state
of the art or fiber type defenses were viable. The jury also considered the issue of punitive damages and returned
its Phase 1 verdict after about seven weeks of trial. In addition to finding defective products, the jury found all
five defendants to be grossly negligent and, in response to a special interrogatory, found punitive damages
multipliers ranging, for the five defendants, from $1.50 to $3.00 for each $1.00 of actual damages.
Phase II was designed for another jury to establish levels of exposure for various worksites and crafts for
defendants, including those defendants who settled, and to apportion percentages of causation among the
defendants. As it turned out, defendants stipulated to findings on all of the issues in Phase II.
Phase III dealt with damages. The court divided the cases into five disease categories based on plaintiffs' injury
claims and selected a random sample of cases from each disease category. The categories, total numbers, and
sample sizes (in parentheses) were: mesothelioma-32 (15); lung cancer-186 (25); other cancer-58 (20); asbestosis
1,050 (50), and pleural disease-972 (50). Two new juries were impaneled and they sat together for five days to
hear general medical testimony. They then sat separately and heard testimony, group-by-group, on cases from
each of the five injury groups and returned separate damage verdicts for all the cases from each group over a
period of approximately 3 months. The juries considered the groups in descending order of severity, starting with
the mesothelioma cases. Judge Parker reviewed the verdicts and ordered remittiturs in 34 pulmonary and pleural
cases and in one mesothelioma case. According to Professor Mullenix, in a case study of Cimino, Judge Parker
“used almost every known technique for aiding jury comprehension, including extensive pretrial and posttrial jury
instructions, jury notebooks, notetaking, interim summations, and witness photographs to refresh the jury's
memory.” Linda S. Mullenix, Beyond Consolidation: Postaggregative Procedure in Asbestos Mass Tort
Litigation, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475, 572 (1991). Based on statistical evidence presented at a post-trial
hearing, Judge Parker found that the sample cases were in fact representative of the total population on all relevant
variables. Defendants did not challenge the statistical evidence. After calculating the remittiturs and including
cases with zero verdicts, the court applied the average damage awards within each disease category to the
remaining cases within that category. Plaintiffs waived any rights to individual damage determinations.
Defendants objected on due process grounds. The court rejected those challenges, saying that “unless this plan or
some other procedure that permits damages to be adjudicated in the aggregate is approved, these cases cannot be
tried.” Defendants appealed, and the Court of Appeals unanimously held that the sampling procedures violated the
Seventh Amendment and perhaps also the Due Process Clause. Cimino, 151 F.3d at 320-21. See also In re
Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1990).
208
See nn. ___, supra, and accompanying text.
209
Of course many of these innovations were later implemented through “proper” legislation. See __.
210
See nn. __ supra and accompanying text. See also Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common
Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 970-82 (1987);
Richard Marcus, Completing Equity’s Conquest? Reflections on the Future of Trial Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 725, 725 (“[A]s to the pretrial portion of litigation, equity conquered law.”);
Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376 (1982) (the relaxed procedures of equity allow
activist judges to take control of litigation throughout the pretrial stage); Jack B. Weinstein & Eileen B.
Hershenov, The Effect of Equity on Mass Torts, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 269, 278-81 (1991) (offering examples of
how equity has dominated the legal system through “modes of proof and trial,” and the “varied circumstances in
which courts today turn to equitable remedies” in mass tort cases); Melissa A. Waters, Common Law Courts in an
Age of Equity Procedure: Redefining Appellate Review for the Mass Tort Era, 80 N.C. L. REV. 527, 542-51
(2002) (discussing equity’s triumph in mass tort trial procedures); Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, 56
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 53-54 (1993) (“The war between law and equity is over. Equity won.”); Abram
Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1292-96 (1976) (declaring in
public law litigation the “triumph of equity”); 1 Charles E. Clark, Cases on Pleading and Procedure preface (1930)
(among other highlights of the volume were “[t]he history of equity, and its triumph over law”).
211
See nn. __ supra and accompanying text. See also Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and
Contemporary Procedure, 78 Wash. L. Rev. 429 __ (2003).
212
See ROSCOE POUND, LAW AND MORALS 65 (1924) (“Cases are seldom exactly alike.”); Felix S. Cohen,
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COL. L. REV. 809, 833 (1935) (“Every case presents a
moral question to the court.”).
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of jurisprudence.213 The architects of the merger of law and equity did not
articulate precisely how a unified system could ensure uniformity yet also
depart from rigid rules to ensure fairness in each case. The form and
practice of conditional orders illustrate the tension and demonstrate the
contemporary compromise.
In form, there are an increasing number of instances where judges are
legislatively authorized to impose conditions.214 These codifications
demonstrate the systemic response to the demand for and the utility of
conditions, to-wit: legislation. And indeed, codification is the likely
response if useful but unauthorized conditions are revealed by this essay or
are identified elsewhere. But legislative micromanagement can create
mischief, of course, as rules drafted for one situation then become a major
source of inefficiency and unfairness in unanticipated later situations;215 this
cycle repeats and the pathogens of strict law spread.216 Importantly,
however, this strain of regulatory creep may be different because the
legislation does not prescribe a particular result. Instead, these reforms lead
to legislation that authorizes the exercise of judicial discretion.217
Discretion is the expression of equity in our merged system. Judicial
discretion enables flexibility and ensures a more individualized justice;218
and of course this is entirely consistent with equity’s protocol.219 Yet there
is a significant difference between equity and discretion: symbolically if not
also practically, discretion is exercised from within a zone or frame of
possibilities.220 A judge with discretion may have many options within that
frame, but the exercise of the judicial authority is fundamentally a choice.
Equity is not similarly constrained.221 Indeed, the very purpose of a separate
system of equity was to offer relief from laws that did not—or could not—
anticipate the situation presented.222 Equity presumed that laws were the
product of human calculations that were not always precise and of
213

Henry J. Friendly, Some Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 758 (1982).
See nn. __ supra and accompanying text.
215
See generally Edward H. Cooper, Aggregation and Settlement of Mass Torts, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1943,
1944 (2000) (“[I]t may be better to leave judges free to adapt to the challenges without interference from statutes
and rules framed for the last war by Congress and the rulemaking committees.”).
216
See generally Bayless Manning, Hyperlexis: Our National Disease, 71 NW. U. L. REV. 767, 767 (1977);
Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429, __ (2003).
217
See nn. __ supra and accompanying text.
218
See FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, EQUITY AND THE FORMS OF ACTION 4-7 (A.H. Chaytor ed., 1909);
Sidney Post Simpson, Fifty Years of American Equity, 50 HARV. L. REV. 171 (1936); 1 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 27, at 19 (12th ed. 1877).
219
See JOHN FREEMAN MITFORD, TREATISE ON THE PLEADINGS IN SUITS IN THE COURTS OF CHANCERY BY
ENGLISH BILL 112, 123 (George Jeremy ed., 1980); RICHARD WOODDESON, A SYSTEMATICAL VIEW OF THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 203-06 (T. Payne ed., 1792).
220
See nn. __ supra and accompanying text.
221
Robert Severns, Nineteenth Century Equity: A Study in Law Reform, 12 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 81, 89 (1934)
(the Chancellor had “the right and the powers, in fact, to do as he likes, whatever hard law and still harder practice
may dictate.”)
222
See Robert Wyness Millar, ____ 24 (1952); Robert Severns, Nineteenth Century Equity: A Study in Law
Reform, 12 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 81,84 (1934).
214
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generalizations that were not always general.223 Equity offered an escape
from rigid rules and empowered the judicial imagination.224 But this part of
equity’s protocol has faded in the unified system. In form, then, that part of
equity’s protocol represented by judicial discretion has been embraced and
authorized,225 while that part of equity’s protocol that enabled and
encouraged exercises of the judicial imagination has been curtailed or
rejected.226
In practice, however, the spirit of equity may innovate and create,
whether or not authorized. In this essay it has been demonstrated that judges
are imposing some conditions that may be facilitating creative, fair, and just
outcomes; yet those orders are not authorized by the standard sources of
judicial authority.227 Such practices may be illustrative of other
unauthorized exercises of judicial authority that are tolerated if not also
desired. For example, no matter the political resistance and prevailing case
law, judges must, or at least will craft creative, dramatic forms of injunctive
relief to remedy certain wrongs.228 And regardless of the procedural
infrastructure, judges with unusual demands of case management will
undoubtedly try to deviate from those rules.229 Although some exercises of
this authority could be challenged or even reversed on appeal, others may
never be reviewed by an appellate court. Or appellate courts, too, may
recognize that some judicial actions are useful or beneficial even without
formal authority. For example, in many appeals in cases where conditional
orders were issued, neither the parties nor the court even questioned the
propriety of the condition.230
Equity is a natural precursor to the law’s innovations, and thus the
dissonance between form and practice could be viewed in a very positive
light.231 Codified discretion is an inadequate substitute for equity. Equity
can play an important role in the growth of the law, and without that engine,
“our law will be moribund, or worse.”232 A merged system of law and
equity could (and in fact presently does) tolerate this practice through
223

Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429, 434 (2003).
JOHN SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 1–5 (13th ed. 1906) (suggesting that the true and original distinction
between law and equity is one not between two conflicting bodies of rules, but between a system of judicial
administration based on fixed rules and a competing system governed solely by judicial discretion); BALDWIN,
supra note __, at 64 (referring to equity as a court “of indefinite powers and unrestricted procedure”).
225
See nn. __ supra and accompanying text.
226
See nn. __ supra and accompanying text.
227
See nn. __ supra and accompanying text.
228
See nn. __ supra and accompanying text.
229
See nn. __ supra and accompanying text.
230
See nn. _supra and accompanying text.
231
See GOLDWIN SMITH, A CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 209 (1990) (crediting Sir
Henry Sumner Maine for the famous dictum that there are three methods by which the law has sought to meet
changing conditions: (i) fictions; (ii) legislative amendment; and (iii) equity). See also Melvin M. Johnson, Jr.,
The Spirit of Equity, 16 B.U. L. REV. 345, 352–53 (1936).
232
Percy Bordwell, The Resurgence of Equity, 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 741, 749 (1934).
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benign neglect. But accusations of judicial activism are forthcoming.233
And, more significantly, Constitutional mandates demand reform. Articles I
and III of the Constitution clearly allocate procedural rulemaking authority
to Congress; the courts are the guest in this realm.234 Further, given the
reasonable expectations of litigants, the Due Process Clause may also
demand closer adherence to the form.235
But if the mismatch between form and practice cannot be ignored, then
how should it be rectified? Modifying the practice to match the existing
form is probably both undesirable and unworkable. Conditional orders are
an extremely useful technique for finding intermediate and compromise
solutions; eliminating these options would be an unfortunate tack.
Moreover, such an undertaking might also be impossible since judges
already impose or induce conditions in a variety of circumstances where
they lack the formal authority to do so; efforts to educate trial and appellate
judges about the limits of their authority could be effective, but this seems
unlikely.
If the practice will not or cannot be modified, then presumably the
mismatch can only be rectified by modifying the form to authorize the
practice. In other words, the form must give judges the authority to impose
useful conditions. This approach could be undertaken with more rules
authorizing conditions (and discretion). But as demonstrated by the status
quo and as described in Part IV, the profoundly ironic consequence of rules
that confer discretion is that they may, in fact, ultimately reduce judicial
discretion. By delineating the boundaries of the authority to impose a
condition, or by codifying flexibility, the rule not only bounds judicial
authority to those particular reference points, but even worse, bounds
judicial authority in other contexts where the discretion or flexibility is not
detailed. Legislative efforts usurp the more robust role that inherent
authority would otherwise perform.236
The better approach, then, is not more rules, but fewer rules. More and
longer rules will never anticipate all of the eccentricities that fate or human
ingenuity are “virile enough to devise.”237 My effort here is to urge a
commitment and return to more flexible rules of procedure that reflect the
rhetoric and common perception that the Federal Rules are “all equity.”238
Amendments that add the authority to condition or that purport to give
discretion perpetuate a cycle that leads to the creation of further procedural
insufficiencies that, in turn, require still more elaboration. That cycle must
233
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be broken with broader rules that facilitate vigor and common sense and
efficiency and fairness in their application. Conditional orders offer a useful
case study of a paradox: rules that purport to authorize, may in fact
constrain.

